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i 
The Satellite Operations Support Expert System contract is an effort to 
identify aspects of satellite ground support activity at Goddard Space Flight 
Center (GSFC) which could profitably be automated with artificial intelligence 
(AI) and to develop a feasibility demonstration for the automation of one such 
area. 
International Sun-Earth Explorer (ISEE) control facility as the application 
domain. 
intricacies were expected to not complicate the development process. This 
allowed the resultant system to illustrate the application and development of 
AI technology in the satellite support environment. 
To accommodate the one-year contract time frame, GSFC selected the 
The three ISEE satellites are relatively simple so that operational 
The importance of considering automation in general is addressed at several 
points in this document. 
potentially increasing the effectiveness with which a task is performed and 
decreasing the long ruu costs. 
considered later in this document. 
Automation can be considered as a means for 
This  essential cost-benefit tradeoff will be 
If automation is considered, then it may be profitable to examine the possible 
use of artificial intelligence technologies. 
is quite straightforward. 
complex--can be suitably automated with conventional hardware and software. 
In cases where the task is more intricate, involves substantial experiential, 
non-textbook knowledge, or is perhaps less constrained, expert reasoning too l s  
from AI may prove to be appropriate. 
In many instances, the decision 
Many applications-though perhaps rather 
Since the focus of this contract was on the illustration of AI technology and 
system development, the above considerations were traded off in favor of 
providing insight into the workings of expert systems. 
greater detail later, we decided to use the hydrazine propulsion subsystems 
(HPS) of the International Sun-Earth Explorer (ISEE) and the International 
As explained in 
Ultraviolet Explorer (IUE) as application domains. 
examination of candidate applications and the realization that all of them, 
save one or two at the most abstract research-oriented level, could be more 
efficiently automated using conventional approaches. 
This was after extensive 
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We chose.to build a demonstration fault handling system for an HPS. 
system is written in Franz Lisp and is currently hosted on a VAX 11/750-11/780 
family machine. 
which HPS (either from ISEE or from IUE) to run the system on. 
chooses the fault desired for the run. The demonstration system generates 
telemetry corresponding to the particular fault. 
fault handling module then uses this telemetry to determine what and where the 
fault is and how to work around it. Graphics are used to depict the structure 
of the HPS, and the telemetry values displayed on the screen are continually 
updated. 
and of having the system describe its actions and reasoning at each step. 
system can be used to handle up to two sequential faults t o  demonstrate the 
fault handling process for spacecraft in degraded conditions. 
The 
As detailed in a later section, it allows the user to select 
The user then 
The completely separate 
The user has the option of having each rule displayed as it is fired 
The 
This final report describes the capabilities of this system and its 
development cycle. The following sections discuss: 
I1 - The choice of application domain 
I11 - The process of requirements analysis 
IV - The design process 
V - The implemenFation experience 
VI - Advantages of an approach to automation 
V I 1  - Results of the contract experience 
VI11 - Conclusions drawn from the experience as to the nature 
and appropriateness of automation 
A user's manual for the demonstration fault handling system has been prepared 
under separate cover. 
11. CHOICE OF THE APPLICATION D O M N  
In the first task of this contract, we sought to identify activity areas 
within the GSFC control center that could benefit from automation via 
artificial intelligence (AI). 
areas could benefit from standard automation, few appeared intricate enough to 
We found this a difficult task: while many 
-2- 
justify the use of AI. 
applications for AI techniques was the decomposition of activities within the 
ISEE control center into six categories: 
An important step in the analysis of possible 
1) 
2) 
3 )  
4) ground coverage scheduling; 
5 )  experiment scheduling; and 
6 )  experiment management. 
telemetry monitoring (for both experiments and spacecraft operations); 
deciding what action to take in response to known problems; 
deciding what action to take for novel problems; 
A detailed discussion of the automation of each of these activities is 
included in Appendix D of this report. To summarize, although most activities 
needed automation via conventional software, two activities appeared to be 
complex enough to use AI. 
generation. 
commands which fulfill the request of an experimenter. 
request, for example, that a sensor be focused on a particular stellar 
These were command generation and procedure 
The first of these is the process of identifying a set of 
An experimenter might 
object. An automated command generation system would determine what needed to 
be done on the spacecraft to effect the request--the spacecraft may need to be 
rotated, other experiments may need to be modified or turned off, etc. The 
system would then generate a series of commands that could be uplinked to the 
satellite to make it do what was needed. A procedure generation system would 
do the same type of processing but for spacecraft operations rather than the 
onboard experiments. 
Although the initial target domain was ISEE, it appeared that it would be 
useful to also consider the more complex control center for IUE. After 
further analysis it was concluded that for ISEE automated command generation 
was easily implemented with conventional software because of the limited set 
of commands available and their applicability to only one procedure. 
to consideration of procedure generation for spacecraft management. 
Marietta personnel with experience in spacecraft support and housekeeping 
systems identified a number of problems which were examined during another 
on-site visit to the ISEE control center. 
complexity of procedure generation was lacking in the ISEE context. 
procedures in ISEE are a set of unrelated activities to be performed at a 
This led 
Martin 
However, it became clear that the 
The 
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specific time, For comparison, procedure generation for IUE was analyzed. 
The procedures in the IUE context were more complex than those in ISEE and 
each procedure had a logical coherence. 
procedures were conceptually connected to other procedures. 
Unfortunately, as with ISEE, few 
If this interconnection existed, then a general body of knowledge about a 
particular procedural area would be used by various logical processes to 
generate a number of different procedures. 
and interaction of different reasoning processes in an expert system. 
this interconnection did not exist, a specific set of information and a 
specific, different set of rules would be used to generate each procedure. 
Few, if any, rules could be used in the generation of more than one 
procedure. 
procedure generation was an appropriate activity for illustrating the various 
aspects of expert systems. 
This would illustrate the function 
Since 
As a result, it was decided that neither command generation or 
As discussed in the introduction to the requirements document (see Appendix E 
of this report), three additional possibilities for us(ing expert systems 
techniques emerged: 1) in executive control functions, 2) in high-level 
mission workarounds, and 3)  for fault handling. The first two were eventually 
dismissed, partly because automation considerations in these areas should be 
incorporated in the design phase of satellite system development. 
Since the intent of this effort was to provide an example of artificial 
intelligence approaches in the satellite control domain, it was decided that 
fault handling could be a suitable application. 
subsystem (HPS) was selected as the focus for this application for several 
reasons, as discussed in the requirements document. Chief among these is that 
although quite straightforward, the HPS is nonetheless one of the most complex 
subsystems on ISEE. 
AI concepts of rule-based reasoning and representation while being simple 
enough not to be obscured with technical minutia. 
The hydrazine propulsion 
A fault handling system for an HPS could illustrate the 
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It was a l s o  noted that there exists considerable similarity between HPSs on 
different spacecraft. 
generalize the diagnostic process and thus be able to operate the 
demonstration system on multiple HPS configurations. 
desirable, it was not clear that it would be possible to build the simulation 
system such that it could generate the telemetry data necessary to support 
this within the scope of the contract. However, it was decided to attempt 
this since it would illustrate the flexibility achievable in automated 
reasoning systems. 
It was reasoned that it would be relatively easy to 
Although this was 
111. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
A portion of this phase was spent understanding hydrazine propulsion systems 
in detail. 
this exploration, we established the set of faults which the demonstration 
system would handle. These are: 
This information is documented in Section I1 of Appendix E. From 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0. 
0 
0 
0 .  
0 
Leak in the hydrazine storage tank 
Leak in a section of the line 
Failure of a latch valve to open 
Failure of a latch valve to close 
Failure of an engine valve to open 
Failure of an engine valve to close 
Failure of a heater to turn off 
Failure of a heater to turn on 
Failure of a catalyst bed 
In addition to these, we originally believed that clogged filters would be an 
appropriate fault. 
way to distinguish between a completely clogged filter and a valve that is 
stuck closed. Since these faults have identical symptoms, we decided to 
exhibit only  one, the stuck valve, for the purpose of the demonstration. 
Also, we decided to include certain sensor failures as possible faults. 
are failures in engine valve and latch valve sensors (which read open or 
closed), fuel pressure sensors, and fuel line and catalyst bed temperature’ 
sensors (which read a specific numeric value). 
Further exploration, however, established that there is no 
These 
Section I11 of the requirements document details the symptoms associated with 
each (non-sensor) fault and the appropriate workaround. 
modifications, are the primary specifications to which the fault handling 
portion of the demonstration system was built. 
These, with the above 
After the initial requirements analysis, it was decided to design more 
complexity into the demonstration system. 
to be able to handle faults for multiple HPS configurations (within logical 
limits). It was decided to have the ISEE and IUE configurations available and 
to allow the user to design his own configuration as well. 
simulation complexity considerations, the user configuration option was later 
deleted. Although untested, the diagnostic code is in place but not the 
interface 1/0 code which would allow the user to make his design selections.) 
Further, we chose to allow the user to select multiple sequential faults, 
again within logical constraints. 
particular fault, the user is then allowed to do one of three things: 
Thus, we chose to build the system 
(For time and 
Thus, having executed a trial run with a 
1) Choose a fresh configuration (ISEE or IUE) and a fault for that 
otherwise normally operating HPS; 
2)  Choose a second fault for the same configuration, now oper?ting in 
"degraded" mode; 
~ 3)  Exit the system, finishing the demonstration run. 
With the above-mentioned modifications, the system was implemented towards 
meeting the intent of the requirements document with regard to the fault 
handling module. 
I 
The fault handling capabilities identified above require considerable support 
software. 
an 1/0 or interface module, an internal model for representing the functional 
state of the H P S ,  and a telemetry generation module. 
more detail in the design and implementation sections of this report and in 
the design document: 
The requirements document identifies an executive control module, 
These are treated in 
the original intent for these modules has also been met. 
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It is appropriate to add that the telemetry generator was a requirement we had 
not expected at the outset of the contract. 
historical tapes of actual, decommutated telemetry data from the ISEE (or IUE) 
spacecraft. It proved impractical to use such tapes. First, decommutated 
tapes were more difficult to access than tapes of raw data. Second, the 
historical tapes have relatively few fault symptoms on them, since there have 
been few significant failures on these spacecraft. 
canned data could lead to suspicions of a hardwired diagnostic system. 
Finally, if such data were used, it would be difficult to show the results of 
either the diagnostic actions (opening and closing valves and.firing 
thrusters) or the workarounds. 
handler would have to perform actions that correlated with the data coming 
next on the tape. This would be quite unrealistic. Consequently, it was 
necessary to add the unanticipated task of developing a simulation program to 
generate telemetry. This turned out to be a considerable effort: the logic 
for the telemetry generator is quite complex-more complex, in fact, than that 
of the fault handler. 
We had anticipated using 
Third, to use a set of 
Unless the data were manipulated, the fault 
This significantly impacted the development time. 
IV. DESIGN PROCESS 
This section will deal with the design process for the expert system. First, 
a system overview will be presented, which will discuss the overall operation 
of the system. Next, a brief description will be presented of the individual 
modules including a discussion of the rationale for the decompostion selected. 
System Overview 
The overall flow of control through the program is directed by the executive. 
After initialization of the program environment, the executive is invoked. It 
calls a part of the I/O module which queries the user for choice of propulsion 
system configuration, fault type, and fault location. Choice of configuration 
entails identifying a model of the propulsion system for internal use by the 
demonstration system. Once the user selects a configuration, either ISEE or 
IUE, the appropriate model is loaded from a file. 
the system's internal model of the HPS is modified accordingly for use by the 
telemetry generator. 
When the fault is selected, 
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The executive next calls the exposure module, which examines the fault 
selected in the context of the configuration. 
determines what state the propulsion system should be in to cause the fault to 
influence the operation of the spacecraft. 
which symptoms will appear in the telemetry stream as either abnormal or 
unexpected values. The exposure module identifies how the HPS should be 
"commanded" (using routine actions) to move into such a state and informs the 
user of what actions, if any, will be performed. 
these actions t o  the executive. 
The exposure module then 
This "exposure" state is one in 
It then returns a list of 
The executive now calls upon the telemetry generator and passes to it the list 
of actions received from the exposure module. The telemetry generator modifies 
the internal model of the HPS to reflect the effects of these actions and 
calculates the appropriate telemetry values for the new state of the HPS. 
This telemetry is displayed to the user via the graphical depiction of the IIPS 
and examined for unexpected values by a distributed monitoring system embedded 
within the telemetry generator module. 
reported quantitatively with respect to the telemetry and expected values 
(e.g., 270 telemetry, 290 expected) and qualitatively with respect to the 
Any abnormal or unexpected values are 
difference between the telemetry and expected values (e.g., "lower"). 
values are incorporated into a list of symptoms which are then passed on to 
the fault handling module (FHM). 
These 
The F H M  concludes as much as possible from the initial symptoms available and 
if it is unable to pinpoint the fault precisely it decides what actions will 
yield the necessary information to complete the isolation process. The FHM 
then describes what symptoms have been noted, any deductions which it has 
made, and what actions are being requested, if any. Next, the FHM returns to 
the. executive module the list of actions to be performed. Thereafter, things 
proceed as they did after the exposure module returned its list of actions. 
That is, the executive passes the list of actions on to the telemetry 
generator, which modifies the internal model to reflect the actions being 
performed and calculates the new telemetry values. These values are screened 
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to identify the abnormal and unexpected readings, and the results passed on 
to the FHM, and so on until the FHM has isolated the fault as precisely as 
possible. The FHM then informs the user of its conclusion, identifies the 
parts of the system which are unusable as a result of the fault and the 
workaround, and returns a list of actions which will effect the workaround. 
This list is passed to the executive and from there on to the telemetry 
generator for implementation. 
When the workaround has been implemented and telemetry has normalized the user 
is given either two or three options, depending on the type of trial which has 
just completed: 
a) the user can end this session; 
b) the user can run a trial on either HPS configuration, beginning from 
a normal fault-free HPS; or 
c) if the trial just completed was for the initial fault in an HPS, the 
user can select another fault in the same HPS. 
its current "degraded" state, retaining the original fault and its 
workaround, and then accept a second fault from the user. 
The BPS will begin in 
In the first case, the demonstration program will terminate. 
latter two cases, the program will perform as described above. 
In either of the 
Design of the modules 
Every large program should have a module devoted to program control and data 
passing. In this case, the executive module performs this task. The executive 
calls procedures which then perform their function and return results to the 
executive. 
by the next part of the program and calls the next procedure with the 
necessary data. 
procedure, or it may be a modified version of that data, or it may include 
data generated earlier. The executive is responsible for knowing the needs of 
the procedures which it calls and either itself modifying or having another 
The executive takes these results, determines what data is needed 
This data may be whatever was returned from the previous 
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b . 
procedure modify the available data so that it conforms to the specifications 
of the next procedure, in format as well as content. For example, the 
executive calls a procedure to put the list of symptoms in a certain order 
before the symptoms are made available to the FHM. 
The exposure module is a module which is not absolutely essential but which 
is, nonetheless, very helpful for a demonstration system. 
module is to determine how the chosen fault can be exposed so that the system 
can begin at once to perform the isolation and subsequent workaround. While 
any fault chosen would eventually become noticeable if the HPS were asked t o  
perform random routine actions, by requesting a specific set of routine 
actions the exposure module can enable immediate detection of one or more 
symptoms of the fault. 
project can occur, which is the expert system isolating the fault and then 
determining a workaround. 
The purpose of this 
As soon as symptoms are noticed the true focus of this 
The expert system requires input from the user at several points in the 
demonstration and presents data to the user in many different ways. 
decided, therefore, to have an 1/0 module to deal specifically with this task 
It was 
of system-user interface. 
presented to the user $0 determine what HPS configuration, level of 
explanation, display of rules and choice of fault are desired. 
also contains the procedures used to display the HPS configuration on the 
screen and to insert the updated values as they are created by the telemetry 
generator. 
The 1/0 module contains several menus which are 
This module 
Since the expert system will not be hooked up to actual satellite monitoring 
equipment, it was necessary to simulate the telemetry which would normally be 
downlinked from a satellite. This task is handled by the telemetry generator 
module. 
fault information, and knowledge of the previous values t o  decide what would 
be appropriate telemetry, values for a given state of the HPS. 
The telemetry generator uses structural information about the HPS, 
This 
information is stored in an internal model (described below) and accessed by 
the telemetry generator so the new values can be computed. This module also 
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has a telemetry monitor embedded within it. 
when the telemetry differs from expectations and composes a list of these 
values to be passed on as symptoms to the FHM. 
procedures for telemetry monitoring should be contained in a separate module. 
If the expert system were using actual satellite telemetry data, then these 
monitoring procedures would be in their own module. Since the telemetry data 
must be simulated, however, and since the telemetry monitor uses many of the 
same procedures as the telemetry generator to access values from the internal 
model, these two functions were combined into a single module. 
The telemetry monitor determines 
It could be argued that the 
The internal model of the HPS contains information about the structure of the 
current HPS model, the current fault selected by the user (and the previous 
fault, if any), a d  the various values for each monitored attribute of the 
system. The structural information deals with the number of each type of 
component, and which components are above and below a given component. 
fault information reveals whether a given component has a fault associated 
with it, and specifies the exact nature of the fault. Each monitored 
attribute in the internal model has three values associated with it. These 
values are: 
The 
o Actual value - the value used by the telemetry generator to define 
the true value of the attribute being measured. 
o Telemetry value - the value reported by a sensor which is supposed to 
measure the attribute. This will be the same as the actual value 
unless the sensor is faulty. 
o Expected value - the value which should be reported by a sensor if 
every part of the system which affects the attribute and the sensor 
itself are functioning normally. 
either the attribute being measured or the measuring sensor, then the 
telemetry value w i l l  differ from the expected value. 
If a fault exists which affects 
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The fault information and the actual values are accessible only by the 
telemetry generator, which needs this information to accurately determine the 
effects of a fault when generating the telemetry values. 
information can be accessed by all modules, since such information would be 
kept in an internal model even if the system didn't need an internal model for 
simulating the data from a satellite. 
models would emphasize what information is both needed for and available to 
only the telemetry generator, it is easier to have two distinct conceptual 
models which are implemented as a single model with the understanding that 
most modules do not access certain data in this model. 
The other 
Although maintaining two distinct 
The fault handling module (FHM) contains the code to perform the actual 
isolation of the fault and determine the appropriate fault workaround. 
module consists of four major components: 
This 
o The knowledge base - this consists of rules which encompass the 
"expert" knowledge about the effects and symptoms of faults, common 
fault isolation techniques, and appropriate fault workarounds. 
o Isolation procedures - these procedures are called by rules in the 
knowledge base to determine what specific actions are needed to 
assist the isolation process and to compose this list of actions 
which is returned from the FHM. 
o Workaround procedures - these procedures are used to help determine 
what actions are needed to enable the HPS to recover from the fault 
as fully as possible. 
knowledge base after the fault is isolated. 
that only essential knowledge is retained. 
There is also code here which cleans up the 
This code makes certain 
o Explanation procedures - these procedures handle the. explanation 
presented to the user. 
to describe what has been deduced, what actions are being requested 
and why, and the final results of the isolation and workasound. 
They are used by both of the above components 
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V. IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE 
This section describes the tools used in implementing the expert system and 
the process of moving from the design to the implementation. The latter 
includes a description of some of the changes from the original design made 
during the implementation phase of the project and the rationale for these 
changes. 
The implementation tools 
The entire expert system, except for the knowledge base, was written in the 
programming language Franz Lisp. At this time, Lisp is the most prevalent 
programming language for AI applications and Franz Lisp was chosen because it 
is the Lisp dialect residing on the GSFC VAX 11/780, which was the target 
machine for the demonstration phase of this project. 
The knowledge base was written in MRS, which stands for Modifiable 
Representation System. MRS was used because it has rule base capabilities 
which facilitate the storing and accessing of information in a partitioned 
format. This ability is useful for several reasons. 
storing expert knowledge because such knowledge can generally be easily 
expressed in statements of the form IF [one or more conditions are true] THEN . 
[do qne or more things]. 
modified or added to a knowledge base without requiring modification of the 
rules already there. 
A rule format is good for 
Rules are also useful because they are easily 
FRS also allows pattern-matching of data to rules, which allows a rule to be 
more general than the simple IF clause of typical programming languages. 
Pattern-matching enables a rule to specify certain slots in a data item as 
needing to match exactly with part of the rule and other slots to be any 
value. 
reports any symptom can look for a data item which contains the component name 
"lv" (for latch valve) and not worry about the component number or position of 
the valve. In the HPS for ISEE, there are four latch valves, so having one 
rule to check for any latch valve symptom as opposed to one rule for (lv 1 
open . . . ) , a second rule for (lv 1 closed . . . ) , a third rule for (lv 2 open 
... 1, etc. allows one rule to do the work of eight. 
Thus, a rule which is intended to work whenever any latch valve 
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Since MRS allows the rules and data to be partitioned, using it is also more 
efficient than using regular Franz Lisp code for the knowledge base. The rules 
are grouped together according to class of fault (e.g., latch valve, catalyst 
bed, engine valve, etc.) and stored in the knowledge base according to these 
groups. Once initial isolation is done and the expert system knows to which 
group the fault belongs, it checks only the rules in that group and ignores 
rules in the other groups. 
applicability, the run-time speed of the program is increased. 
By diminishing the number of rules checked for 
The implementation process 
Once the design of the modules was completed and the system overview 
describing the flow of control between modules was done, work on the actual 
implementation of the system began. This consisted of assigning the various 
modules to specific programmers, with constant intercommunication so that 
there wouldn't be confusion about the format or content of data passed between 
modules. During this process, it became evident in some cases that a task 
initially assigned to one module could be implemented more efficiently within 
a different module. On these occasions the programmers involved would agree to 
transfer responsibility for the task in question and any code already written 
by the original programmer would also be transferred. 
Changes made during implementation 
As mentioned earlier, there were occasions during the implementation of the 
expert system when changes from the original design were made f o r  various 
reasons. Below are examples of what was changed during the implementation of 
the system and a justification of why each change was deemed necessary or 
worthwhile. 
Change #l: Modifying the internal model 
Modifying the internal model of the HPS was originally designed into the 
executive module. 
task, rather than the executive, for two reasons. 
It was decided to have the telemetry generator perform this 
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First, the telemetry generator already needs access to the internal model to 
produce the telemetry values. 
complete access to the internal model, including the actual values as well as 
the telemetry values (sensor readings). Since an expert system would normally 
have access only to the telemetry values and not to actual values, it was 
decided to minimize the number of modules which did access the actual values. 
In this system, actual values are accessed only when modifying the internal 
model and when calculating the telemetry values. Therefore, it made sense to 
have the telemetry generator perform any necessary modifications to the 
. internal model and thus be the only module that needed to see the actual 
To do this, the telemetry generator has to have 
values. Since the telemetry generator is already called whenever the model is 
modified so it can calculate the new telemetry values, having it perform this 
additional task required no change in the overall flow of control. 
A second reason for moving this task out of the executive is that such a task 
is realistically beyond the scope of an executive's responsibilities. 
executive is intended to be a high-level controlling module which passes data 
and calls procedures while delegating lower-level tasks (such as the modifying 
of the internal 'model) to the subordinate modules. 
The 
Change #2: Describing actions that the HPS performs 
Describing the actions being performed by the HPS was also originally designed 
as a task for the executive module. This has been changed so that it is now 
done by the module responsible for requesting the action. There are two 
different modules which can request actions to be performed in the HPS and 
are, therefore, responsible for describing these actions to the user. 
The first of these is the exposure module. 
desired fault, the exposure module passes to the executive the list of actions 
chosen to bring symptoms of the fault to light. Before passing this action 
list, however, the exposure module informs the user of what actions will be 
done. If no actions are being performed to expose the fault, as is sometimes 
the case, the user is informed of this fact. 
After the user specifies the 
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The other module that is able to request actions is the fault handling module 
(FHM). 
isolate the fault. 
the fault workaround. 
the actions that w i l l  be performed before passing the action list to the 
executive module. 
This module can request various actions when it needs more data to 
The FHM also composes the list of actions necessary for 
Like the exposure module, the FHM informs the user of 
Changing where the description of actions takes place was done for two 
reasons. 
what is being done and why and, therefore, can readily inform the user of 
this. If the description of actions were to be done by the executive or 
another module other than the one requesting the actions, one of two things 
would be necessary. Either the description would have to be composed by the 
requesting module and passed along with the action list, or the module 
receiving the list of actions would have to examine the list to find out what 
was being requested, and then try to figure out why those actions were being 
requested. 
module that requests the actions perform the description of those actions. 
Also, the latter method could entail a significant amount of computation while 
First, the module creating the list of actions will know exactly 
Neither of these methods are as straightforward as having the 
still. yielding an incomplete or inaccurate description. 
The second reason for not having the executive responsible for the description 
of actions was mentioned to some extent previously. The executive's job is to 
receive and pass data from those procedures that actually perform the 
computations. Therefore, requiring the executive to know what that data is 
should be unnecessary. The executive should be able to pass data among the 
modules without worrying about the specifics of what it is passing. 
responsibility for the description of actions being performed to the 
requesting modules, the executive doesn't have to examine the list of actions 
before passing them on to the telemetry generator. 
By moving 
Change 13: Allowing two sequential faults 
The original proposal called for the system to handle a single fault in an HPS 
by isolating the fault, working around it, and then going to a new HPS. 
was subsequently decided to enhance the system by adding a multiple-fault 
handling capability. The handling of two simultaneous faults was dismissed 
for two reasons. 
It 
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First, the combinatorial difficulties of allowing the faults in the HPS to be 
simultaneous would greatly complicate the expert system. 
have offsetting symptoms, different combinations of faults could have the same 
combinations of symptoms, and there may be no way of isolating certain 
combinations of faults given the amount of information available. 
Two faults could 
Another consideration is that faults in a satellite's HPS are very rare. 
is due to the emphasis on quality construction when something is to be 
launched into space, far away from the nearest serviceman. 
things going wrong simultaneously was deemed to be fairly insignificant and 
the additional effort of dealing with simultaneous faults was not 
justifiable. 
feasible. 
reason about how that fault might influence the symptoms of other faults, and 
also allowed it to determine when it might need to use a different process for 
isolation or workaround of a sequential fault. 
handle two sequential faults, while requiring more work than that necessary 
for single faults, was not excessive. 
fault might occur sometime during the entire lifespan of a satellite is high 
This 
The chance of two 
Handling two sequential faults, however, was judged to be 
Knowledge of the initial isolated fault enabled the system to 
Therefore, the ability to 
Also, the possibility that a second 
enough to warrant consideration, as it is greater than the odds of two 
simultaneous faults. Therefore, the arguments against two simultaneous faults 
do not fully apply to the case of two sequential faults. 
It was decided to deal with only two sequential faults, rather than some 
greater number, for several reasons. First, since the HPS is assumed to be 
fairly reliable, the probability of increasingly greater numbers of faults 
diminishes rapidly. Conversely, the complexity required in the expert system 
for handling greater numbers of faults increases rapidly. 
therefore, a greatly decreasing return on the effort invested in handling more 
than two sequential faults. 
HPS generally renders the HPS unusable regardless of the possible workarounds , 
so attempting to handle more than two faults in the same HPS is all too often 
There is, 
Also, the presence of three or more faults in an 
an empty gesture. 
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VI. AUTOMATION 
An evaluation of the Multiple Satellite Operations Control Center (MSOCC) led 
to the conclusion that automation of several aspects of this center is both 
feasible and highly desirable. 
conjunction with a network of computer workstations, to be used by the 
center's analysts, the benefits will increase. These benefits include 
increases in efficiency and reliability, as well as the solution of several 
existing problems which will be detailed below. 
If this automation is implemented in 
One problem is that certain data and procedures may be stored in only one 
location within the MSOCC, so they are less accessible to analysts in other 
parts of the center. 
for dealing with various situations, could result in analysts remote from the 
procedure storage location trying to remember or guess at what to do in 
situations where a particular procedure should be followed. 
This locality of information, especially with procedures 
The standard way to attack this problem is to maintain copies of needed data, 
procedures, etc., throughout the MSOCC, thereby assuring a copy will be 
convenient for any analyst requiring this information. 
however, leads to a different problem. 
scattered about makes it difficult to organize and update the information. 
does little good to have several locations where information is available, if 
the information there may be incomplete, inconsistent or outdated. 
This solution, 
Having multiple copies of information 
It 
A network of computer workstations distributed throughout I4SOCC is recommended 
because such a network would avoid both of the above problems. Having on-line 
files which contain the satellite data and the policies and procedures for 
dealing with common situations w i l l  result in easy access to this information 
by any analyst who requires it. 
information cau no ionger be controiied. 
(This does not mean that access to 
ii is sirai&iiorward iu LeatLict 
access to certain files according to user.) 
on-line copy of each file of information is needed. 
organization and updating of the information. 
Moreover, only one primary 
This simplifies the 
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. 
Other problems can result from having information divided among several 
different storage mediums. 
on computer tapes, in engineering drawings, or in manuals. 
Information is currently found in filing cabinets, 
One problem with this is that it requires any analyst who uses this data to be 
familiar with all of the mediums used to store it. 
with the filing system, loading tapes, reading drawings, etc. 
This includes familiarity 
Another problem is that a variety of mediums tends to result in a variety of 
storage formats. 
information to use whatever format he or she prefers, and thus it is often 
difficult for another analyst to rapidly assimilate information from different 
sources. The use of different storage mediums necessitates some difference in 
storage formats and, therefore, it is difficult to discourage analysts from 
varying the format even further to suit their preferences. 
There is a tendency for each creator or maintainer of 
These problems are also addressed by having a network of workstations to 
contain information. There would be only one storage medium used on a regular 
basis-computer tapes would be used for backup purposes only and hard copies 
(printouts) of the information are maintained in case of hardware problems 
with the computer network. 
use of the workstations. 
network facilitates enforcing a single storage format, so processing the 
information would be faster and easier than before. 
Therefore, analysts need only be familiar with the 
Also, having single copies of information on the 
Automation of repetitive, simple tasks can enhance efficiency in two ways. 
First, computers typically can perform simple tasks such as range checking 
much faster than a human. 
performing a task, so it can be relied upon to not overlook incoming data. 
is also dependable when it comes to remembering to log data and actions as 
required. 
Second, a computer cannot become distracted while 
It 
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. 
There are several different types of tasks which would be suitable for 
automation, especially with the use of a network of workstations. 
include: telemetry monitoring, decision making in both known and novel 
situations, scheduling of ground coverage and experiments, and management of 
experiments. 
can be found in Appendix D of this report. 
These tasks 
A more detailed discussion of possible automation of these tasks 
Other uses for automation would include automatic report generators and data 
formatters. 
the analysts, facilitate the updating of databases, and allow easy generation 
of procedure manuals based on actions taken in response to new situations. 
Such programs could use the results of the other automated components of the 
system. 
These would allow rapid creation of transcripts for processing by 
Standard automation such as telemetry monitoring would also facilitate the 
introduction of more sophisticated programs, such as expert systems to perform 
diagnosis or planning. 
is often in a format which is readily usable by an expert system. 
interface is helpful for two reasons. 
This is because the output of the standard automation 
Such an 
First, a sophisticated user interface for input t o  the expert system is not 
required. It is relatively simple to have a procedure perform any needed 
modifications to the output of a telemetry monitor, for example, to change the 
data into the input format used by an expert system that performs fault 
analysis. 
was monitoring the data create the inputs to the expert system, since the 
expert system may then have to accommodate typing errors, transposed 
parameters, etc. 
It would would generally be more difficult to have an analyst who 
Another advantage to having an automated system provide inputs into an expert 
D J D C U u  .LQ 4 - ch-e C I l C z C  it czii pzs.6 the iiifariilatiaii iiiiich faater thsii aii aiidysZ cuuid 
type it. 
is clearly a point in favor of automation. If the expert system needs to 
interact with a monitoring agent (i.e., check for the presence of certain 
telemetry, request changes in the scope of the monitoring), removing the 
comparatively slow analyst from the chain increases the run-time speed of the 
expert system even more dramatically. 
For programs that need to operate in a real-time environment, this 
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VII. RESULTS 
Our experience with constructing the demonstration fault handling system 
brought a spectrum of results from an understanding of satellite operations 
control center activity to an illustration of the use of artificial 
intelligence languages for simulation. These will be discussed in turn. 
As indicated, the detailed interaction with members of the ISEE and IUE 
control centers evolved an in-depth understanding of many control center 
activities. This understanding allowed us to identify different 
automation approaches for different aspects of each activity. We explored 
several in detail, including procedure generation, command generation, and 
scheduling, before centering on fault handling. 
A recommendation emerged for an in-depth analysis of the automation of 
each and all aspects of a control center. 
has generated an abstract study of this nature, and we propose, as well, 
an analysis in the concrete terms of a particular control center. 
Together with this recommendation, we have presented a high-level 
description of one possible approach to that automation (see Section VI). 
This is, in effect, a global control mechanism or strategy that would 
coordinate other automated elements. 
Computer Technology Associates 
We have developed a demonstration software system to perform fault 
handling on the hydrazine propulsion system of either the ISEE or IUE 
spacecraft. 
VAX ll/780 and ll/750 series machines. 
and terminal configurations (a V T l O O  compatible terminal), it could be 
hosted on other machines, including the "supermicros," running Franz Lisp. 
This system runs in Franz Lisp and is presently hosted on the 
With appropriate memory resources 
The demonstration system exemplifies how "production rules" can be used as 
a programming language. 
under Franz Lisp. During a trial run of the system, the user can elect to 
see the rules printed out, either in their general form with all variables 
unbound or as they have matched to specific data elements in working 
memory. 
The rules are written in the MRS tool which runs 
(An annotated example of rule printing is included in Appendix C.) 
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In the first of these cases, the user can obtain an appreciation for the 
generality and expressive power of a rule-how it can be used to cover a 
number of situations. In the second case, the user sees the rules in 
their "instantiated" form. 
inserted into the appropriate places in the rules, the user can understand 
how that rule is functioning in a specific situation. 
following the internal logical flow of the fault handling process. 
In this form, with all the actual data values 
This aids in 
The demonstration system also illustrates the use of artificial 
intelligence languages for simulation. 
building a simulation to generate telemetry afforded us this opportunity. 
While a variety of AI tools could have been used for this, we opted to 
build the simulation directly in Franz Lisp. Had we been working on a 
Lisp Machine, we might have chosen to implement the simulation in the 
object-based language Flavors or, if we had been working in Interlisp, in 
ROSS, an experimental AI language designed to build simulations. 
Unfortunately, the user can witness little of the inner workings of the 
telemetry generation: 
that it outputs are displayed to the user. 
The unanticipated requirement of 
it was designed so that only the telemetry values 
The system presents the possibility of using English to describ-e the 
system analytic process. 
description to see. 
description can be presented. 
it is making various deductions and conclusions and describe the actions 
it is requesting. 
The user has a choice of what level of 
It can be turned off almost entirely, or a full 
The system can thus depict for the user how 
Documentation of how this system has been developed has been generated in 
the various interim reports and deliverables and in this report. 
includes : 
This 
o 
o 
choice of the application domain; 
the set of faults the system would handle (this is the high-level 
requirements specification for the rule-based fault handling module); 
o requirements for the support system; 
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o preliminary design; 
o modifications to the initial design conception; and 
o implementat'ion. 
h) Developing the system provided an expanded understanding of development 
time considerations for AI-type systems. Additions to and changes in 
performance specifications complicated this issue. 
i) The experience solidified the understanding of the importance of 
development environments for AI-type systems. The facilities provided by 
a Lisp Machine running, say, Zetalisp, greatly increase the ease of 
understanding how a piece of code is functioning and therefore how to fix 
its bugs. 
assistance and only in-house debugging tools aided in this process. 
The facilities resident in Franz Lisp are of almost no 
Further, the graphics capabilities inherent in a Lisp Machine and other 
personal work stations are highly sophisticated, simple to use, and run 
with minor overhead. 
use with a VTlOO series terminal adds a significant processing load. 
Using intricate programming tricks, we were able to provide a pleasant 
graphics display with almost no overhead. 
because the graphics never changed: 
design his own configuration been retained, it would not have been 
feasible to provide a graphic display for it without using a special 
graphics package with its significant associated overhead. 
Hosting a full-blown graphics package on a VAX for 
We were able to do this only 
had the option of letting the user 
j) We chose MRS, the Modifiable Representation System, as our inferencing 
tool because it fulfilled our objective better than other reasoning tools 
available,on the VAX. MRS is not a traditional production system such as 
OPS5, EMYCIN or HAPS. It has a variety of powerful representation and 
reasoning capabilities, including the forward chaining ability which we 
used to drive our rules. 
chaining in a way that is convenient to the system builder (a similar 
statement can, regrettably, be made about other reasoning too ls  as well). 
Unfortunately, MRS is not designed to do forward 
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Thus there are, for example, cases where extra rules or extra clauses in 
rules must be inserted to perform bookkeeping and cleanup actions. 
optimal conditions, a tool of this nature would perform such activities in 
a way the user would not even need to know about. 
of this experience relates to the appropriateness of the development tools 
independent of the development environment. 
detailed in the next section. 
Under 
A final result, then, 
The conclusory results are 
V I I I .  CONCLUSION 
In the course of developing the demonstration fault handling system for this 
contract, we identified a number of considerations about control center 
automation in general. Developing this particular system entailed a detailed 
examination of control center activities. It is clear from this that most of 
these activities could be automated. Ideally, this automation should be 
designed in as an integral aspect of the center operations during conception 
and development. 
configuration can be expensive and inefficient. However, adding automation 
need not be an intensive, disruptive process. 
incrementally to an existing center with minimal inconvenience and 
commitment. 
to determine if further automation is justified. 
Retrofitting extensive automation to an existing 
Automation can be added 
The benefits at each stage of automation would then be evaluated 
More important, perhaps, is the question of what techniques should be used to 
automate the different activities. Approaches run the gamut from hardware 
components (e.g., sensors that control heater activity thermostatically) to 
conventional software (using, e.g., decision trees in C or FORTRAN) to 
artificial intelligence (using perhaps a production system or an automated 
planning tool). In deciding what approach to take, it is useful to consider . 
that automation is important for (a) labor intensive activities and (b) 
activities requiring considerable, decaiied icnowieage or expertise. 
When an activity reaches a certain level of either repetition or complexity, 
automation is appropriate. The level of automation should be matched to the 
type and priority of the task. 
above and are generally automatable by conventional technology. 
Most control center activities fall under (a) 
Those in the 
-24- 
second category may be potential candidates for automation using artificial 
intelligence. 
centers within the MSOCC at GSFC. 
There are a limited number of these in the existent control 
These include global coordination and 
executive functions and situations requiring causal or deep reasoning using an 
understanding of, perhaps, physics and astrodynamics. In these situations and 
in the scheduling activities, however, there are political concerns which 
would need to be addressed. 
In any case, the tradeoff between the cost of automation and the 
benefit--viewing each from both a short-term and long-term perspective--is 
very important. 
to warrant the extensive automation of activities specific to a particular 
spacecraft. 
handling, however, are more generic, and systems to automate these could be 
used for several different spacecraft, both simultaneously and across time. 
It is important as well to consider the potential for the ongoing evolution of 
an automated system. It could simply be extended to do more. Alternately, it 
could be a somewhat general system which, with a small effort, could be 
adapted to perform the same activity in different situations. These and other 
forms of evolving a system would create a cost factor independent from any 
ongoing maintenance. 
be the most appropriate place to focus an automation effort. 
would produce the greatest long-term benefit: 
automated system. Unfortunately, this leaves a dilemma: 
more labor-intensive tasks (such as telemetry monitoring) are generic, the 
activities requiring the greatest experience and expertise tend to be highly 
spacecraft specific-for example, a causal reasoning system to troubleshoot a 
particular subsystem or, even more so, a particular experiment. 
The life expectancy of many spacecraft may not be long enough 
Some of the processing tasks such as scheduling and fault 
These more generic and/or evolvable activities then may 
Such a focus 
a multi-purpose and "reusable" 
while many of the 
Thus, the decision to automate is a complex consideration of several factors 
which require close examination and careful balancing. 
for such systems come down, the cost benefit ratio will improve, especially in 
the long term. 
over what time frame w i l l  the fixed construction costs plus any ongoing 
maintenance costs be spread? 
be for human labor over the same time period if the automation were not done? 
As construction costs 
Now, longevity of use is perhaps the major consideration: 
Is that cost greater than the total cost would 
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Additional risks must be considered such as the l o s s  of a satellite for which 
spacecraft-specific automation is done. 
generality and adaptability of the automated system.) 
examination, inappropriate automation decisions, and hence expenditures, might 
be made. 
(This again will be influenced by the 
Without such 
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APPENDIX A 
Glossary o f  Terms 
G1 ossary 
A I  - A r t i f i c i a l  I n t e l l i g e n c e .  
Asser t  - t o  p lace  da ta  i n  working memory. 1 h . r  a c t i o n  can r e s u  
r u l e s  " f i r i n g "  (see F i r e ) .  
t i n  
Asser t ion  - a da ta  i t e m  which has been p laced i n  work ing memory. 
Catbed - C a t a l y s t  bed, see t h e  HPS component d e s c r i p t i o n s  on page A - 3 .  
CB - C a t a l y s t  Bed, see the  HPS component d e s c r i p t i o n s  on page A - 3 .  
EV - Engine Valve, see the  HPS component d e s c r i p t i o n s  on page A - 3 .  
Exper t  system - a computer program designed t o  " i n t e l l i g e n t l y "  per fo rm 
some task  by u t i l i z i n g  t h e  knowledge and p r a c t i c e s  o t  one or  more 
exper ts  i n  t h e  task  domain. 
FHM - F a u l t  Handl ing Module. 
F i r e  - term used t o  descr ibe  t h e  process whereby t h e  p r e c o n d i t i o n s  o f  a r u l e  
- a r e  s a t i s f i e d .  causing t h e  consequents of the  r u l e  t o  be executed. 
GSFC - Goddard Space F l i g h t  Center. 
HPS - i iydraz ine Propusion Subsystem. 
ISEE - I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Sun-Earth Explorer,  a s a t e l l l t e  c o n t r o l l e d  by GSFC. 
IUE - I n t e r n a t i o n a l  U l t r a v i o l e t  Explorer ,  a s a t e l l i t e  c o n t r o l l e d  by GSFC. 
LLV - Lower La tch  Valve, r e f e r s  t o  the lower  s e t  o f  l a t c h  va lves  i n  IUE. 
See the  l a t c h  va lve  component d e s c r i p t i o n  on page A - 3.  
LV - Latch  Valve, see t h e  HPS component d e s c r i p t i o n s  on page A - 3.  
A -  1 
MOSES - Miss ion Operat ions Support Exper t  System, t h e  demonstrat ion 
f a u l t  handl ing system b u i l t  under t h i s  c o n t r a c t .  
MRS - Mod i f iab le  Representat ion System. a mul t i -purpose t o o l  f o r  model ing 
and represent ing  knowledge. Our system uses t h e  ru le-based f e a t u r e s  
o f  WRS t o  i n c o r p o r a t e  knowledge i n t o  a c o l l e c t i o n  of r u l e s .  
WSOCC - M u l t i p l e  S a t e l l i t e  Operat lons Cont ro l  Center. 
Rule - a format f o r  encoding knowledge, u s u a l l y  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  a s e t  o f  
p recond i t ions  fo l lowed by a s e t  o f  a c t i o n s  t o  be performed i f  the  
precond i t ions  are  s a t i s f i e d .  
TG - tank group, see t h e  HPS component d e s c r i p t i o n s  on page A - 3.  
THR - t h r u s t e r ,  see t h e  HPS component d e s c r i p t i o n s  on page A - 3.  
ULV - upper l a t c h  valve.  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  upper s e t  o f  l a t c h  va lves  i n  W E .  
See t h e  l a t c h  va lve  component d e s c r i p t i o n  on page A - 3.  
Workaround - a s e t  of a c t i o n s  designed t o  negate o r  min imize t h e  e f f e c t s  
o f  a f a u l t  on t h e  f u t u r e  performance o f  t h e  system. 
Working memory - a s p e c i f i c  l o c a t i o n  i n  memory f o r  da ta  t o  be p laced so 
t h a t  i t  can be accessed by t h e  r u l e s  as needed. 
A - 2  
The components which compose an HPS are as f o l l o w s :  
o Tank groups - groups of tanks which s t o r e  l i q u i d  hydraz ine  f u e l  on 
the  s a t e l l i t e .  (See F igu re  A-1)  
o Fuel l i n e s  - l i n e s  which c a r r y  the l i q u i d  hydraz ine  throughout the  
p ropu ls ion  system (see F igu re  A-2). 
o Fuel l i n e  heaters  - heaters  found a long most of the  t h e  f u e l  l i n e s ,  
they  prevent  the  l i q u i d  hydrazine from f r e e z i n g  i n s i d e  t h e  l i n e s .  
o La tch  va lves  - va lves  which are p laced i n  s t r a t e g i c  l o c a t i o n s  w i t h i n  
an HPS. They are normal ly  open, b u t  can be c losed t o  i s o l a t e  sec t i ons  
of f u e l  l i n e  d u r i n g  the  f a u l t  i s o l a t i o n  and workaround processes. 
o Engine va lves  - va lves  which open b r i e f l y .  causing f u e l  t o  f l o w  over 
a c a t a l y s t  bed. and then au tomat i ca l l y  c lose.  They a r e  used t o  f i r e  
the  t h r u s t e r s .  
o C a t a l y s t  beds - these a re  very  h o t  beds over which t h e  f u e l  i s  passed, 
causing the  l i q u i d  hydraz ine  t o  change t o  gas and produce a t h r u s t .  
o Thrus ters  - nozz les  through which the  i g n i t e d  hydraz ine  gas i s  fo rced,  
g i v i n g  the  s a t e l l i t e  t h e  Intended t h r u s t  (see F igu re  A-3). 
KEY TO DIAGRAMS 
- 
1 - 1  - Fuel tank 
1 1 1  - Valve, open (usual s t a t e  o f  l a t c h  va l ves )  
- 
- 
- 
1 - 1  - Valve. c losed (usual  s t a t e  of engine va l ves )  - 
- - C a t a l y s t  bed and t h r u s t e r  j-! 
A - 3  
An example o f  tank groups i s  shown below: 
Tank Group I1 l a n k  Group #2 
I I - 
II 
I 
- 
I I I 
. 
Figure  A - 1  ( P a r t  o f  ISEE hydraz ine p r o p u l s i o n  system) 
Even though there are  e i g h t  separate tanks, t h e r e  are  o n l y  two f u n c t i o n a l  tank  
groups. Each group has four  tanks which are connected v i a  t h e  same f u e l  l i n e ,  
and have t h e  same group o f  components d i r e c t l y  below them. l a n k  Group # l  
c o n s i s t s  of ( T i  12 13 1 4 )  w i t h  (LV1 LV2) below and l a n k  Group (12 c o n s i s t s  of 
(T5 16 17 18)  w i t h  (LV3 LV4) below. 
An example o f  fue l  l i n e  i s  shown below: 
I I I I 
Figure  A-2 ( P a r t  of IUE hydraz ine p r o p u l s i o n  system) 
A f u e l  l i n e  i s  s p e c i f i e d  by t h e  components a t  e i t h e r  end o f  it. It i s  p o s s i b l e  
f o r  a s e c t i o n  o f  l i n e  t o  have severa l  components a t  e i t h e r  end, as seen above. 
A - 4  
An example o f  the path t o  the thrusters I s  shown below: 
- 
1 1 1  LV  - 
I - 
1 - 1  E V 3  
0 
- I
1-1 EV2 
I - 
0 
1 - 1  E V 1  - 
I - I I - 
1-1 C B l  L THRl 1-1 CB2 8 THRP 1-1 CB3 L THR3 
/ \  / \  / \  
Figure A-3 ( P a r t  o f  IUE hydratlne propulsion system) 
When an engine valve opens. f u e l  flows t o  the c a t a l y s t  bed, where i t  
becomes a gas. I s  l g n l t e d  and forced out through the thruster  nozzle.  
A - 5  
. 
APPEWDIX 8 
Assumptlons 
. 
TYPE OF SENSOR 
pressure' 
Assumptions 
LOCATIONS WITHIN THE HPS 
One w i t h i n  each tank  group (above the  l a t c h  va lves) .  
The temperature o u t s i d e  the  spacecra f t  i s  assumed t o  be a constant.  Th i s  
avoids r e q u i r i n g  the  te lemet ry  generat ion module t o  know when the  spacec ra f t  
i s  i n  the  sun and when i t  i s  i n  the shade. This  i n  t u r n  pe rm i t s  i t  t o  assume 
cons tan t  heat  d i s s i p a t i o n  when t h e  f u e l  l i n e  o r  c a t a l y s t  bed heaters  a r e  o f f ,  
u n t i l  t he  temperature s t a b i l i z e s .  
Temperature - catbed 
Open/close p o s i t i o n  
Two o the r  assumptions concern the  r a t e  o f  f u e l  loss. I t  is assumed t h a t  
a l l  f u e l  leaks are o f  a un i fo rm s i z e l r a t e .  This  a l l ows  the  exper t  system t o  
assume a s i n g l e  cons tan t  r a t e  o f  decrease i n  pressure when a l eak  i s  p resent .  
S i m i l a r l y ,  e a c h . f i r i n g  o f  a t h r u s t e r  i s  assumed t o  use a f i x e d  amount o f  f u e l  
f rom each tank group, r e s u l t i n g  i n  a uniform decrease i n  pressure. 
There a re  a l s o  assumptions about the  l o c a t i o n  o f  sensors w i t h i n  t h e  HPS. 
The sensors a re  l o c a t e d  such t h a t  a l l  f a u l t s  can be i d e n t i f i e d ,  y e t  f a u l t s  
cannot be p i n p o i n t e d  immediately i n  cases such as l i n e  f a i l u r e s .  This  a l l ows  
demonstrat ion o f  the  exper t  system "searching" sec t i ons  o f  f u e l  l i n e  be fore  
i s o l a t i n g  a l i n e  l eak  o r  heater  f a i l u r e  p r e c i s e l y .  Below i s  a t a b l e  c o n t a i n i n g  
the l o c a t i o n s  of va r ious  sensors. 
. 
One w i t h i n  each c a t a l y s t  bed. 
One a t  each l a t c h  va l ve  and a t  each engine va lve.  
~ _ _ _ _ _  
Temperature - f u e l  l i n e  I One immediately above each engine valve.. 
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APPENDIX C 
Example of a F a u l t  Being Isolated 
This  i s  an example o f  t he  system i s o l a t i n g  a pressure sensor f a u l t .  The f a u l t  
which has been se lec ted  i s  t h e  sensor a t  t g l  ( t ank  group 1) read ing  lower  than 
the  a c t u a l  pressure. 
( A l though t h e  d i s p l a y  o f  t h e  HPS i s  no t  shown, t h e  system's exp lanat lon ,  t h e  
symptoms asser ted  t o  the  FHM, t h e  ac t lons  requested from t h e  FHM, and t h e  
r u l e s  be ing  f i r e d  are  a l l  shown. Some comments t o  a s s i s t  t h e  reader  i n  
understanding the  process o f  ru les  t i r i n g  and t h e  source o f  exp lana t ion  
w i l l  be enclosed i n  angle brackets ,  "<" and ">" ) 
No a c t i o n  r i l l ' b e  performed i n  exposing t h i s  f a u l t .  
< Th is  d e s c r i p t i o n ,  and t h e  a c t i o n  l l s t ,  come f rom t h e  exposure module > 
< L i s t  o f  ac t i ons  passed t o  te lemet ry  generator: none 
The a s s e r t i o n - l i s t  i s :  ( ( t g  1 lower 230 3 0 0 ) )  
< Th is  l i s t  i s  composed by t h e  d i s t r i b u t e d  te lemet ry  mon i to r  embedded w i t h i n  
t h e  te lemet ry  generator  and then passed t o  the  execut ive.  The a s s e r t i o n  l i s t  
i s  composed o f  a s e t  o f  s u b l i s t s  ( i n  t h i s  case o n l y  one), each rep resen t ing  
a te lemet ry  p o i n t  whose sensor reading d i f f e r s  f rom i t s  expected va lue.  Here, 
t he  sensor a t  tank group one repo r t s  a lower  pressure than expected. The 
sensor read ing  i s  236 when i t  was expected t o  be 3 0 0 .  The execut ive  asse r t s  
each i t e m  on the  a s s e r t i o n  l i s t  i n t o  the  work ing memory o f  t he  FHM. > 
c - 1  
The a s s e r t i o n  being asser ted  now: ( t g  1 lower  236 300) 
< Below i s  t h e  f i r s t  r u l e  t h a t  f i r e d .  > 
( runnable 
< Below i s  t h e  b ind ing  l i s t  of each v a r i a b l e  I n  t h e  
(Var iab les  are  encased by v e r t i c a l  bars  and conta  
r u l e  and i t s  va lue.  
n a d o l l a r  s i g n  " S " ) .  
By l o o k i n g  a t  the " i f"  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  r u l e  and t h e  preced ing  asse r t i on ,  
the  reader can see how t h e  va lues f o r  t h e  v a r i a b l e s  were found. I n  t h i s  
r u l e .  t h e  system looked f o r  any a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  had f i v e  s l o t s ,  and t h e  
f i r s t  s l o t  had t o  be "tg". When t h e  above a s s e r t i o n  was asser ted  ( p u t  I n t o  
work ing memory), t h e  " tg "  matched t o  t h e  above r u l e .  and t h e  a s s e r t i o n  had 
f i v e  s l o t s .  When t h e  r u l e  was " i n s t a n t i a t e d "  ( t h e  " i f"  p a r t  matching t o  
the  a s s e r t i o n ) ,  t he  v a r i a b l e  ISn l  was bound t o  t h e  va lue  1. s ince  they  
were i n  t h e  second s l o t s  o f  t h e  r u l e  and asser t ion ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  The 
1Sq1 i n  t he  t h i r d  s l o t  6f  t h e  r u l e  was bound t o  " lower" i n  t h e  t h i r d  
s l o t  o f  t h e  asser t ion ,  t h e  I S t l  was s i m i l a r l y  bound t o  236, and ISe l  
t o  300 .  The second p a r t  o f  t h e  "if" clause means t h a t  i f  t h e r e  i s  an 
a s s e r t i o n  present  whose f i r s t  s l o t  i s  "ignore-symptom", second s l o t  
i s  "tg". and l a s t  two s l o t s  a re  whatever l t n l  and 1Sq1 were bound t o  
( i n  t h i s  case "1" and " lower") ,  then the 'above r u l e  should n o t  f i r e .  
Since t h e r e  was no such a s s e r t i o n  present  (such an a s s e r t i o n  was "unknown") 
t h e  r u l e  was able t o  f i r e ,  c r e a t i n g  the  b i n d i n g  l i s t  shown below. > 
( ISn I  1 l t q l  lower lttl 236 ISe l  300) 
< Below i s  t h e  next r u l e  t o  f i r e .  > 
( i f  (and tg-symptom l s n l  
( runnable (assert-and 
[unknown ( f a u l t  I 
I 
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< Below i s  the  b i n d i n g  l i s t  of each va r iab le  i n  t h e  r u l e  and I t s  value. 
By l o o k i n g  a t  t he  " i f "  p o r t i o n  of the above r u l e  and the  l a t t e r  p a r t  o f  
t he  preced ing  r u l e ,  t he  reader  can see how t h e  va lues f o r  t h e  v a r i a b l e s  
were found. The preceding r u l e  caused "(tg-symptom 1 lower  236 300)"  t o  
be asser ted  i n t o  work ing memory ( t h e  l a s t  f o u r  s l o t s  of t h e  l l s t  c o n t a i n i n g  
t h e  va lues  o f  t h e  va r iab les ) ,  and t h i s  a s s e r t i o n  matched t h e  "if" p a r t  
of t h e  above r u l e ,  w i t h  the  va r iab les  i n  t h e  above r u l e  r e c e i v i n g  the  
va lues o f  t h e i r  respec t i ve  s l o t s  i n  the asse r t i on .  > 
( I S n l  1 l S q l  lower  l s t l  236 ISe l  300) 
t 1 has repo r ted  a f a u l t  symptom. 
T i e  sensor i n d i c a t e s  a pressure o f  236 when 300 was expected. 
< P r i n t e d  as a r e s u l t  o f  " ( i n i t i a l - d e s c r i b e  ...)" i n  t h e  above r u l e .  > 
< Below i s  t h e  n e x t  r u l e  t o  f i r e .  > 
f a u l t  p ressure  l S n l  1Sq1 dummy) 
con t i nue-fc  ) 
describe-why-? i r e )  
f i r e - random- th rus te r ) ) ) ) )  
lSq( "Sq" x x x x x )  
< Below i s  t h e  b i n d i n g  l l s t  of each va r iab le  i n  t h e  r u l e  and I t s  value. 
By l o o k i n g  a t  t h e  " i f "  p o r t i o n  o f  the above r u l e  and t h e  l a t t e r  p a r t  o f  
t h e  preced ing  r u l e ,  t h e  reader  can see how the  va lues f o r  t h e  v a r i a b l e s  
were found. > 
( I t n l  1 1Sq1 l ower )  
A t h r u s t e r  w i l l  be f i r e d  t o  determine whether t h e  f a u l t  a f f e c t s  t h e  
a t t i t u d e  adjustment. Th i s  i s  done t o  he lp d i s c r i m i n a t e  between sensor and 
p h y s i c a l  f a u l t s .  
< P r i n t e d  as a r e s u l t  of " (descr ibe-why- f i re  ...)" i n  t h e  above r u l e  > 
t h r l  i s  now be ing  f i r e d .  
< P r i n t e d  as a r e s u l t  o f  " ( f l r e - randon- th rus te r  ...)" i n  t h e  above r u l e  > 
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< L i s t  o f  ac t ions  passed t o  te lemet ry  generator :  ( ( e v l  open) ( e v l  c l o s e ) )  > 
The a s s e r t i o n - l i s t  i s :  ( ( t h r  1 nOFmal 100 100) ( t g  1 lower 228 290))  
The a s s e r t i o n  being asser ted now: ( t h r  1 normal 100 100) 
< Below i s  t h e  next r u l e  t o  f i r e .  > 
(if t h r  ISn l  normal l S t l  $ e l )  
l r u n n s b l e  (assert-and and ( p r i n t - r u l e  p306 Sn "Sn" 1st 
l s e l  "$e" x x 
descr ibe-normal - th rus t  normal 
t h r u s t  no rma l ) ) ) ) )  
I 
< Below i s  the  b ind ing  l i s t  o f  each v a r i a b l e ' i n  t h e  r u l e  and 
"$ tu  
f3tI 1 
t s  va lue.  
By l o o k i n g  a t  the "if" p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  r u l e  and t h e  above asse r t i on ,  
the  reader  can see how t h e  va lues f o r  t h e  v a r i a b l e s  were found. > 
( I S n l  1 I S t l  100 lSe l  100) 
There was normal t h r u s t ,  as expected. 
< P r i n t e d  as a r e s u l t  o f  "(describe-normal-thrust ...)" i n  t h e  above r u l e  > 
The a s s e r t i o n - l i s t  i s :  ( ( t g  1 lower  228 290)) 
The a s s e r t i o n  being asser ted  now: ( t g  1 lower  228 290) 
< Below i s  t h e  next r u l e  t h a t  f i r e d .  > 
t g  ISnl $91 I S t l  I t e l )  
unknown ignore-symptom t g  ISn ISq ) 
(assert-and I (and ( p r i n t - r u  ! e p3 81 
(tg-symptom ISnI  
< Below i s  t h e  b ind ing  l i s t  o f  each v a r i a b l e  i n  t h e  r u l e  and i t s  va lue.  
By l o o k i n g  a t  the " i f "  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  r u l e  and t h e  above asse r t i on ,  
the  reader  can see how t h e  va lues f o r  t h e  variables m ~ r n  ?nund; s 
( I S n l  1 IS91 lower lttl 228 ISe l  290) 
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< Below i s  t h e  n e x t  r u l e  t h a t  f i r e d .  > 
f a u l t  pressure ISn l  I S q l  dummy) 
con t i n u e - f c  ) 
unknown (cb Sml  h igher  lS tY  I S e l ) )  
t h r u s t  norma 1 ) )  
x x x x x )  
(sensor-deduct ion fue l -p ressure  
(pressure-sensor- fau l t  l sn l  lsql ) I ) ) )  
normal 
pressure sensor 
( runnable (asser t -and (and ( p r i n t - r u l e  p336 l s n l  "Sn" ISql  "Sq" 
< Below i s  the  b i n d i n g  l i s t  o f  each v a r i a b l e  i n  t h e  r u l e  and i t s  value. 
By l o o k i n g  a t  t h e  " i f "  p o r t i o n  o f  the above r u l e  and t h e  l a t t e r  p a r t  of 
two o f  the  preceding r u l e s ,  t h e  reader can see how t h e  va lues f o r  the  
v a r i a b l e s  were found. > 
( I $ n l  1 1Sq1 l ower )  
S ince t h e r e  was a f a u l t  i n v o l v i n g  t h e  fue l -p ressure  and f i r i n  
< P r i n t e d  as a r e s u l t  o f  "(sensor-deductlon ...)* i n  t h e  above r u l e  > 
t h e  t h r u s t e r  
r e s u l t e d  i n  normal a t t i t u d e  adjustment, a pressure sensor f a u  3 t is deduced. 
< Below i s  t h e  n e x t  r u l e  t o  f i r e .  > 
IS11 I "SP" 
x x x x x ~  
l ( i f  pressure-sensor- fau l t  ISn l  Its1 l r u n n a b l c  (asser t -and (and ( p r i n  - r u l e  p342 ISnlo"Sna 
add-another-ignore-symptoi t g  ISnf 
wrap-up t g  l s n l  sensor - fa i lu re  lSq 
deact iva te- theory  pressure-symptom I 
< Below.is t h e  b i n d i n g  l i s t  o f  each v a r i a b l e  i n  t h e  r u l e  and i t s  value. 
By l o o k i n g  a t  t h e  " i f "  p o r t i o n  o f  the above r u l e  and t h e  l a t t e r  p a r t  of 
t h e  preceding r u l e ,  the  reader can see how t h e  values f o r  t h e  v a r i a b l e s  
were found. 
( I S n l  1 l t q l  l ower )  
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< Below i s  t h e  n e x t  r u l e  t h a t  f i r e d .  > 
wrap-up IScl ISn l  ISf 
runnable (assert-and 
I 
< Below i s  t h e  b ind ing  l i s t  o f  each v a r i a b l e  i n  t h e  r u l e  and i t s  value. 
By l o o k i n g  a t  the " i f"  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  above r u l e  and t h e  l a t t e r  p a r t  o f  
the preced ing  r u l e ,  t he  reader can see how t h e  Values f o r  t h e  v a r i a b l e s  
were found. > 
(IScl t g  ISn l  1 l t f l  s e n s o r - f a i l u r e  l S v l  l ower )  
The f a u l t  i s o l a t i o n  process has completed success fu l l y .  
The pressure sensor for  t g l  reads lower than t h e  a c t u a l  pressure. 
P r i n t e d  as a r e s u l t  o f  " ( f a u l t - d e s c r i b e  ...)" I n  the  above r u l e  > 
This f a u l t  requ l res  t h a t  t he  system no te  t h a t  t h e  tenso r  I s  f a u l t y .  No o t h e r  
ac t i ons  a re  required, and the e n t i r e  HPS remains usable. 
< P r i n t e d  as a r e s u l t  o f  "(workaround ...)" i n  t h e  above r u l e  > 
The f a u l t  workaround has bee6 successful .  The HPS should be ab le  t o  resume 
opera t ion .  
< P r i n t e d  as a r e s u l t  o f  "(workaround-done ...)" In t h e  above r u l e  > 
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APPENDIX D 
Automation Choices for the ISEE 
Control Center 
AUTOMATION OF THE ISEE CONTROL SYSTEM 
A c t i v i t i e s  i n  t h e  ISEE c o n t r o l  cen ter  appear t o  decompose i n t o  s i x  c a t e g o r i e s :  
(1 )  te lemet ry  monitoring ( f o r  both experiments and spacec ra f t  ope ra t ions ) ;  ( 2 )  
deciding what a c t i o n  t o  take  i n  response t o  known problems; ( 3 )  deciding what 
a c t i o n  t o  take  f o r  novel problems; ( 4 )  ground coverage schedul ing,  ( 5 )  
experiment scheduling; and ( 6 )  experiment management. The automation of t h e s e  
a c t i v i t i e s  w i l l  be discussed i n  turn.  
I. TELEMETRY MONITORING 
Telemetry is  c u r r e n t l y  monitored by a s h i f t  a n a l y s t  who s t a r e s  f o r  extended 
per iods  a t  a computer d i sp l ay  attempting t o  c a t c h  te lemet ry  readings t h a t  a re  
out  of l i m i t s  o r  t rending toward a l i m i t  condi t ion .  When he i d e n t i f i e s  such a 
s i t u a t i o n  he n o t i f i e s  t he  p ro jec t  analyst  who makes a l l  dec i s ions  about how t o  
respond. The t a s k  of monitoring i s  ted ious  and mechanical. The s h i f t  a n a l y s t  
knows what the  te lemet ry  value ranges should be and what t h e i r  l i m i t s  are. 'rIe 
scans t h e  a c t u a l  va lues  checking t o  see i f  they f a l l  i n  t h e  expected ranges. 
Trend i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  i s  only s l i g h t l y  more d i f f i c u l t ,  requi r ing  tha t .  the  s h i f t  
a n a l y s t  remember roughly what previous values  were. 
he t h i n k s  one exis ts  by quickly checking t h e  previous values .  
H e  can v e r i f y  a t rend  i f  
Both of these  s h i f t  ana lys t  t a sks  could be r e a d i l y  automated using 
convent ional  software.  Range checking would involve simply comparing each 
value t o  i t s  expected range--a Fortran DO loop wi th  a subrout ine  branch f o r  
out of l i m i t  condi t ions  would su f f i ce  amply. For t rend a n a l y s i s ,  each 
te lemet ry  value sub jec t  t o  numerical v a r i a b i l i t y  could have an eva lua t ion  
func t ion  looking f o r  t he  kind of trend t h a t  value might e x h i b i t .  The c u r r e n t  
value would be c o r r e l a t e d  wi th  whatever number of previous values  are required 
t o  e s t a b l i s h  the  numerical t rend .  Non-numerical t r ends  would be more 
d i f f i c u l t  t o  i den t i fy .  
These act ivi t ies  c o n s t i t u t e  t he  essence of t h e  s h i f t  a n a l y s t ' s  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  The remainder appear t o  be typing commands t h a t  t he  p r o j e c t  
a n a l y s t  g ives  him. Consequently, the s h i f t  a n a l y s t  p o s i t i o n  could probably be 
completely el iminated by automation; 
11. DECISION MAKING I N  KNOWN SITUATIONS 
Current ly ,  once the  s h i f t  ana lys t  i d e n t i f i e s  a t rend  o r  ou t  of l i m i t  
condi t ions ,  he r e p o r t s  i t  t o  the  pro jec t  a n a l y s t  who decides  what a c t i o n  t o  
take .  I n  genera l ,  t h e  dec i s ions  the p r o j e c t  a n a l y s t  makes based on te lemet ry  
cond i t ions  appear q u i t e  simple. A s i n g l e  te lemet ry  poin t  i s  used t o  i d e n t i f y  
a spacec ra f t  problem o r  s i t u a t i o n  and a s i n g l e  canned procedure i s  used t o  
address  i t .  This  appears  t o  be a very simple 
D-1 
If-Then situation--a s i n g l e  I f  cond i t ion  ( o r  two o r  t h ree  when spacec ra f t  
conf igura t ion  must be taken i n t o  account) and a s i n g l e  Then consequent (e .g . ,  
use  Proc 1 7  o r  contac t  experimenter X ) .  Problem areas addressable  by If-Then 
r u l e s  a r e  f requent ly  candida tes  f o r  an  exper t  system. An exper t  system could 
be used here but i t  would be p o i n t l e s s  t echn ica l ly .  
The r u l e s  are  too s i m p l e ,  t he  reasoning cha ins  are gene ra l ly  only one r u l e  
long, and consequently t h e r e  i s  no room f o r  exp lo ra t ion  of reasoning t h a t  i s  
not  canned. The responding t a s k  could be d e a l t  wi th  much more e f f i c i e n t l y  
from a technica l  po in t  of view by avoiding the  overhead of a product ion system 
and ins t ead  using s tandard software developed s p e c i f i c a l l y  f o r  t h e  app l i ca t ion .  
The main technical  argument f o r  using a n  exper t  system would be f o r  t he  u s e r  
i n t e r f a c e .  
explana t ion  t r a c e s  and que r i e s  about system reasoning, o ld  r u l e s  t o  be changed 
and new ru les  t o  be en tered .  A s  noted above, dynamic explana t ion  would 
probably play l i t t l e  o r  no r o l e  here .  
changed o r  added i n  a convent ional  sof tware system i f  t he  i n t e r f a c e  were 
proper ly  designed. 
discussed below. 
A good i n t e r f a c e  f o r  an exper t  system would al low dynamic 
I n  add i t ion ,  r u l e s  could be manually 
Automated genera t ion  and i n s e r t i o n  of new r u l e s  w i l l  be 
111. DECISION MAKING I N  NOVEL SITUATIONS 
This i s  perhaps the  most s u i t a b l e  area f o r  incorpora t ing  a r t i f i c i a l  i n t e l l i -  
gence i n  ISEE opera t ions .  
a n a l y s t  who draws on knowledge of spacec ra f t  (and sometimes experiment) des ign  
and operat ions,  an understanding of t he  c u r r e n t  conf igu ra t ion  and o r i e n t a t i o n ,  
and a knowledge of physics .  
gene ra t e s  a command sequence t o  e f f e c t  i t .  I f  t he  s i t u a t i o n  i s  important 
enough, he w i l l  develop a canned procedure which can be used i n  t h e  f u t u r e  t o  
handle such s i t u a t i o n s .  
access .  I n  c e r t a i n . c a s e s  t h e  p ro jec t  ana lys t  may have i n s u f f i c i e n t  knowledge 
about a p a r t i c u l a r  problem o r  subsystem and must c a l l  i n  an exper t .  
r e s u l t s  of t h i s  a n a l y s i s  may o r  may not be cod i f i ed  i n  a procedure depending 
on whether the problem might eve r  ar ise  again.  
The t a s k  i s  c u r r e n t l y  performed by t h e  p r o j e c t  
When a s o l u t i o n  i s  found, t h e  p r o j e c t  a n a l y s t  
The procedure i s  en tered  i n t o  t h e  system f o r  ready 
The 
A r t i f i c i a l  i n t e l l i g e n c e  could be used t o  gene ra t e  new procedures and command 
sequences t o  handle new s i t u a t i o n s .  
system would incorpora te  t h e  same knowledge the  p r o j e c t  a n a l y s t  ( o r  expe r t )  
c u r r e n t l y  draws on: spacec ra f t  design and opera t ions ,  conf igu ra t ion ,  
o r i e n t a t i o n ,  and physics .  
Such a Procedure Generation Sys tem (PGS) 
It would have t h ree  a n a l y t i c  components. 
would iden t i fy  out of l i m i t  condi t ions  and t h e  implicated spacec ra f t  
configurat ion.  It would determine reachable  conf igu ra t ions  t h a t  t he  c r a f t  
could be safe ly  moved to .  The second would p lan  the  sequence of changes 
 YO^^^ A W L  L L L ~ L L ~ L L I ~  io k'ne one of those desirabie conf igu ra t ions .  The 
t h i r d  would i n s t a n t i a t e  t h i s  change sequence as  a sequence of commands, which 
could then be uplinked t o  e f f e c t  t he  des i r ed  re-configurat ion.  Th i s  f i n a l  
command sequence could be cod i f i ed  as a procedure t o  be used when s imilar  
s i t u a t i o n s  a r i s e  i n  t h e  fu tu re .  
The f i r s t  would be d i agnos t i c .  It 
n a n e n r r - r  5r- -L--- J - - 
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This  PGS could a l s o  be used t o  generate  a l l  t h e  procedures t h a t  would be used 
t o  manage a new spacecraf t .  It  would only need t o  be t o l d  which s i t u a t i o n  t o  
develop procedures f o r .  
F u l l y  automating t h i s  a c t i v i t y  would e l imina te  t h e  most i n t e r e s t i n g  p a r t  of 
t he  p ro jec t  a n a l y s t ' s  job  and t o  some ex ten t  t h e  r e l i a n c e  on a d d i t i o n a l  
ou t s ide  experts .  While t h i s  would be a s i g n i f i c a n t  undertaking,  a 
demonstration of t h i s  c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  subset  of spacec ra f t  
opera t ions  would be t r a c t a b l e  under t h e  cu r ren t  contac t .  
I V .  GROUND COVERAGE SCHEDULING 
The problem of scheduling ground support coverage f o r  t h e  ISEE spacec ra f t  
decomposes t o  a t  least  f i v e  a c t i v i t i e s ,  only two of which are  performed wholly 
w i t h i n  ISEE. F i r s t  t h e  p r o j e c t  ana lys t  develops a seven day advance schedule 
reques t .  This i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  canned and i s  der ived from a gene r i c  schedule,  
which i s  e s t ab l i shed  in accordance wi th  des ign  and ope ra t ion  requirements.  
Occasional ly  i t  a l s o  incorpora tes  special  reques ts  by experimenters  and any 
s p e c i a l  coverage needed' by the  p r o j e c t  a n a l y s t s  f o r  spacec ra f t  opera tors .  
This  schedule request  i s  submitted t o  the  MSOCC schedulers  who coord ina te  i t  
wi th  schedule reques ts  f o r  o t h e r  spacecraf t  con t ro l l ed  out  of MSOCC. 
coord ina t ing ,  c o n f l i c t s  are resolved on t h e  b a s i s  of p r i o r i t y ,  s o  ISEE may 
l o s e  some coverage s l o t s  t h a t  were des i r ed .  
t o  NCC t o  be coordinated wi th  a l l  schedule reques ts  handled by NCC. Coverage 
s l o t s  can aga in  be l o s t .  
In t h i s  
The schedule reques t  i s  then sen t  
The r e s u l t a n t  seven day advance schedule i s  sen t  t o  t h e  ISEE p r o j e c t  
ana lys t s .  I f  any of t h e  s p e c i f i c  unmet schedule reques ts  were c r i t i c a l ,  t h e  
a n a l y s t  con tac t s  t h e  NCC by phone and nego t i a t e s  t o  g e t  coverage a t  t h e  same 
t i m e ,  i f  poss ib le ,  o r  a t  another  t i m e  when the  same o b j e c t i v e s  could be 
accomplished. 
The f i n a l  seven day advance schedule i s  only modified i f  coverage i s  missing 
f o r  a c r i t i c a l  per iod,  another  mission wi th  h igher  p r i o r i t y  enters  a new 
c o n f l i c t i n g  request ,  o r  an  emergency arises such as experimenter c a l l i n g  up 
wi th  a request  f o r  coverage t h a t  he had not r ea l i zed  he needed. 
The process  of generat ing the  seven day advance schedule involves  a look-up t o  
g e t  t h e  canned gener ic  schedule with perhaps a few minor modi f ica t ions  (drawn 
from a s m a l l  set of poss ib l e  ac t ions)  by the  p ro jec t  a n a l y s t  o r  experimenter.  
This  could be automated by a short  convent ional  sof tware program coupled wi th  
a simple menu dr iven  i n t e r f a c e  for  making modif icat ions.  The output  could be 
t ransmi t ted  t o  t h e  schedulers  e l e c t r o n i c a l l y  o r  p r in t ed  f o r  hand t ransmission.  
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The second phase of ISEE a c t i v i t y  i n  schedul ing i s  nego t i a t ing  both wi th  MSOCC 
schedulers  and the  NCC schedulers .  These nego t i a t ions  can g e t  q u i t e  
complicated. For c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  reasons t h e  NCC, f o r  example, i s  f r equen t ly  
unable t o  suggest a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  the  ISEE reques t .  Thus t h e  computer working 
t h e  ISEE s ide  would be required t o  gene ra t e  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  
by the  pro jec t  ana lys t  here  seems s t ra ight-forward:  i d e n t i f y  the  t i m e  
i n t e r v a l  i n  which the  requested coverage could happen and s t i l l  a l low t h e  
des i r ed  ac t ions  t o  take  place; then, vary t h e  requested time wi th in  t h a t  
i n t e r v a l  i n  a f a i r l y  r egu la r  way, checking a t  each new choice po in t  t o  a s s u r e  
t h a t  t h e r e  is s t i l l  an appropr i a t e  t i m e  s l i ce  f o r  achieving t h e  des i red  
ac t ions .  An automated system could even main ta in  h i s t o r i c a l  d a t a  if t h e r e  
were i d e n t i f i a b l e  p a t t e r n s  of resource c o n f l i c t .  The bulk of t h i s  could be 
handled by standard sof tware al though an  expe r t  system could be used if the  
system were t o  do much reasoning about h i s t o r i c a l  pa t t e rns .  
unce r t a in  whether t hese  p a t t e r n s  e x i s t ,  i t  i s  not clear such reasoning would 
be worthwhile. 
The algori thm used 
A s  i t  i s  
There might be cons iderable  r e s i s t a n c e  from t h e  NCC s i d e  t o  having the  ISEE 
ha l f  of t h e  negot ia t ions  automated. N C C  people would then be i n t e r a c t i n g  wi th  
a computer system t h a t  had l imi ted  knowledge of t h e  scheduling process  and 
could not  be led by in tona t ion  o r  innuendo t o  a s u i t a b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e .  It may, 
however, hasten the  automation of t he  NCC schedul ing process  a f t e r  which t h e  
computers would be nego t i a t ing  between themselves. 
V. EXPERIMENT SCHEDULING 
Experiment scheduling on ISEE i s  now almost e n t i r e l y  ro te .  Some experiments 
run a l l  t h e  t i m e .  Others a r e  a l t e r n a t e d  i n  pairs--X on one day and Y o f f ,  Y 
on the  next day and X off--due t o  c o n f l i c t  over  spacec ra f t  resources .  
Occasional ly  an experimenter reques ts  s p e c i a l  t i m e  on i n  what would normally 
be an o f f  period. To comply, t he  p r o j e c t  a n a l y s t  may need t o  reso lve  any 
resource c o n f l i c t s ,  which may mean tak ing  another  experiment o f f  l i n e .  
Clear ly  t h e  r o t e  scheduling could be automated wi th  s tandard  software.  It 
appears  t h a t  t h e  resource c o n f l i c t  r e s o l u t i o n  i s  simple enough t h a t  special 
request  processing could be handled with convent iona l  sof tware a l so .  I t  would 
be p o s s i b l e  t o  use some a r t i f i c i a l  i n t e l l i g e n c e  f o r  t h e  s p e c i a l  request  
processing,  but  the  use would probably be q u i t e  t r i v i a l .  The dec i s ion  l o g i c  
might be something l i k e :  
Is t h e r e  any counterva i l ing  condi t ion  (e .g . ,  resource  c o n f l i c t ) ?  
No: Then schedule t h a t  experiment t o  be turned on f o r  t h e  
appropr i a t e  period. 
Yes: (Assuming problem i s  resource c o n f l i c t  wi th  another  experiment) 
v . I . 7 . 1  
WILL any cr i i s ica i  d a t a  be i o s t  by s h u t t i n g  o f f  t h e  c o n f l i c t i n g  
experiment? 
D-4 
. 
No: Schedule conf l i c t ing  experiment of f  and reques t ing  experiment 
on f o r  appropr ia te  per iod.  
Yes: Then i s  t h e  r e l a t i v e  p r i o r i t y  of t h e  reques t ing  experiment 
h igher  than  t h a t  of t h e  c o n f l i c t i n g  experiment? 
No: Refuse request  
Yes: Schedule c o n f l i c t i n g  experiment off  and reques t ing  
experiment on f o r  appropr i a t e  per iod.  
Questions of relative p r i o r i t i e s  and c r u c i a l n e s s  of d a t a  would have t o  be 
addressed,  but t h e s e  would be given t o  t h e  sof tware system t o  manipulate  so 
t h a t  i t  would not  have t o  deduce them. 
p a r t  a p o l i t i c a l  matter. 
This  is  i n  p a r t  a p r a c t i c a l  and i n  
V I .  EXPERImNT MANAGEMENT 
Management of t h e  ISEE experiments i s  c u r r e n t l y  done almost e n t i r e l y  by t h e  
experimenters  themselves. They send t h e  p r o j e c t  a n a l y s t s  t h e  command 
sequences they want s e n t  t o  t h e i r  experiments. Frequent ly  they  g ive  t h e  
a n a l y s t s  t hese  commands i n  t h e i r  binary coded r ep resen ta t ion .  Sometimes, f o r  
t h e  a n a l y s t s  convenience, they include .the command acronyms so t h a t  t h e  
a n a l y s t  can v e r i f y  t h a t  t h e  commands w i l l  have not  adverse  e f f e c t s  on t h e  
s p a c e c r a f t  . 
For another  spacec ra f t  t he  problem would presumably be d i f f e r e n t .  An 
experimenter might g i v e  t h e  p ro jec t  ana lys t  a high l e v e l  reques t  and t h e  
a n a l y s t  would determine what commands would have t o  be used t o  accomplish i t .  
I n  any case t h e  f i n a l  command sequence i s  typed i n t o  t h e  system by t h e  s h i f t  
ana lys t .  
Automation could be introduced i n  a t  least  two ways. 
cont inue  al lowing (and i n  e f f e c t  requir ing)  t h e  experimenter  t o  gene ra t e  h i s  
own command sequences but  a l low him t o  type  them d i r e c t l y  i n t o  t h e  system 
(e l imina t ing  t h e  s h i f t  a n a l y s t ' s  t ask)  and send them d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  a l r eady  
e x i s t i n g  command management system (CMS) o r  a similar system f o r  v e r i f i c a t i o n  
( the reby  e l imina t ing  t h e  p ro jec t  ana lys t ' s  t a s k ) .  I f  t h e  CMS were used, t h i s  
could b e  done simply by grant ing  the experimenter e l e c t r o n i c  access  t o  the  
system, probably via a dial-up computer l i n e .  The problem of. schedul ing t h e  
a c t u a l  up l ink  of t h e  commands would, of course,  s t i l l  have t o  be addressed. 
The f i r s t  would be t o  
A second way automation could be introduced would be t o  develop a f u l l  Command 
Generat ion System (CGS). 
t o  gene ra t e  h i s  own commands. H e  could i n s t e a d  spec i fy  a high l e v e l  request  
such as "focus sensor  A f o r  my experiment on Alpha P i s c i s  Aus t r in i . "  
system would cons ide r  cu r ren t  sensor and s a t e l l i t e  o r i e n t a t i o n  and determine 
what would have t o  be changed t o  e f f e c t  t h e  request .  
I n  t h i s  a l t e r n a t i v e  t h e  experimenter  would not  need 
The 
For each change requi red  t o  f u l f i l l  t h e  reques t ,  t h e  system would eva lua te  t h e  
impact on both t h e  experiment and t h e  spacec ra f t  as a whole. For every 
adverse e f f e c t ,  i t  would see i f  t h e r e  were any o t h e r  way t o  accomplish t h e  
same th ing  and i f  no t ,  i t  would weigh t h e  p r i o r i t y  of t h e  experiment reques t  
a g a i n s t  t h a t  of t he  a f f e c t e d  component o r  a c t i v i t y .  I f  t h e  p r i o r i t y  of t he  
reques t  were not high enough, i t  would be denied. This  type  of reasoning 
could be used during a h igh  l e v e l  planning of t h e  change sequence. 
high l e v e l  change sequence i s  e s t ab l i shed ,  i t  could be i n s t a n t i a t e d  i n  a 
s p e c i f i c  command sequence. 
Once the  
There are two approaches t o  i n s t a n t i a t i n g  t h e  change sequences as command 
sequences f o r  t h e  CGS. 
and then  set t o  t h e  CMS f o r  v a l i d a t i o n  and even tua l ly  uplinked. A l t e rna te ly ,  
t h e  s p e c i f i c  sequence would be generated us ing  reasoning similar t o  t h a t  used 
t o  genera te  the  h igher  level change sequence. Each command s t e p  would be 
eva lua ted  as it w a s  generated.  Any problems would be i d e n t i f i e d  a s  they a r o s e  
r a t h e r  than  a f t e r  t h e  e n t i r e  sequence--with i t s  compounded problems--had been 
e s t ab l i shed .  This would be cons iderably  more e f f i c i e n t .  
The command sequence should be genera ted  completely 
A command genera t ion  system which funct ioned i n  t h i s  way would be h igh ly  
use fu l :  as mentioned above, i t  would remove t h e  involvement of bo th  t h e  s h i f t  
a n a l y s t  and t h e  p r o j e c t  ana lys t .  I n  gene ra l ,  such a system would need a f a i r  
amount of knowledge about t h e  spacec ra f t  and i t s  experiments.  
I n  t h e  case of ISEE, however, t h e  range of t h i n g s  a n  experimenter  could 
reques t  appears t o  be very small, e.g., changing vol tage  level  of t h e  
experiment o r  s e n s i t i v i t y  l e v e l  of t h e  sensors  between h igh  and low, o r  
focusing a sensor on a new ob jec t .  Thus t h e  amount of knowledge needed by 
such a system f o r  ISEE may be f a i r l y  small. I n  any event ,  i t  appears  t h a t  t h e  
reasoning ( a s  d i s t i n c t  from t h e  knowledge) requi red  t o  accomplish command 
genera t ion  i n  gene ra l  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  s t ra ight forward .  A s  a r e su lk ,  a command 
gene ra t ion  system f o r  t h e  ISEE a p p l i c a t i o n  may be q u i t e  s imple and hence 
implemented a s  r e a d i l y  using convent ional  sof tware as wi th  an  expe r t  system 
approach. 
V I I .  CONCLUSION 
The objec t ive  of t h i s  e f f o r t  i s  t o  bui ld  a demonstration system based on the  
ISEE mission ope ra t ion  support  c e n t e r  a c t i v i t y  t h a t  could be expanded towards 
space s t a t i o n  app l i ca t ion .  For  a more complicated mission,  e i t h e r  a Command 
Generation System (CGS) o r  a Procedure Generat ion System (PGS) could be 
considered f o r  t h i s  end. For  t h e  f i r s t  of t hese  a knowledge base of which 
reques ts  and commands are poss ib l e  g iven  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t  of a s i t u a t i o n  could 
be implemented as r u l e s  i n  a product ion system such as HAPS. The system would 
con ta in  a model of t h e  cu r ren t  spacec ra f t  con f igu ra t ion  and would use  these  _-- L w u r y - t ~ s ~ ~ ~ ~  LU s e r ~ r ~ d t a  cvuunand sequences EO accompiisn requescs .  t... -.....-----*,. & _  --_.-- 
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A Procedure Generation System would have the  same conf igu ra t ion  model and a 
similar knowledge base containing information about handling novel s i t u a t i o n s  
as w e l l  as about sequencing commands. 
Other a spec t s  and components of the systems would be r e l a t i v e l y  similar. As 
an example, t h e  man-machine in t e r f ace  f o r  t h e  CGS might a l low more i n t e r a c t i o n  
( s i n c e  more input  would come from the human), but t h e  s t y l e  of i n t e r a c t i o n  
would be the  same as the  s t y l e  of the PGS i n t e r f a c e .  
In  terms of conten t  as opposed t o  presenta t ion ,  t h e  PGS would address  problems 
of spacec ra f t  management while the CGS would be d i r e c t e d  a t  experiment 
management. For s u i t a b l y  sophis t ica ted  missions,  t hese  problems may be 
equal ly  complex. For ISEE, however, command genera t ion  f o r  experiment 
management appears too s i m p l i s t i c  for a real exper t  system.and i t  seems t h a t  a 
Procedure Generation System would make t h e  more i n t e r e s t i n g  and soph i s t i ca t ed  
demonstration. 
In a d d i t i o n  t o  ISEE, w e  have examined t h e  Dynamic Explorer  (DE), Nimbus, 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  U l t r a v i o l e t  Explorer (TUE), S o l a r  Maximum Mission (SMM), and 
ERBS. ERBS proved unviable  s ince  i t s  personnel  would be heavi ly  involved i n  
prelaunch a c t i v i t i e s  during 1984. Most of t he  o t h e r s  had a l s o  e s t a b l i s h e d  
r o t e  opera t ing  procedures. A poss ib le  except ion  i s  IUE,  which does more 
complex experiment commanding than t h e  o t h e r  missions: a r e -o r i en ta t ion  of a 
sensor  f r equen t ly  r equ i r e s  re -or ien ta t ion  of t h e  spacec ra f t ,  which may make 
f o r  involved planning. 
We have i d e n t i f i e d  a two-stage development process  f o r  a procedure genera t ion  
system (PGS). 
unit--which would be developed i n  sepa ra t e  s tages .  The planner  would take  as 
i n p u t s  an i n i t i a l  spacec ra f t  conf igura t ion  and a f i n a l ,  t a r g e t  conf igura t ion .  
It would work h i e r a r c h i c a l l y ,  planning t h e  sequence of changes necessary t o  
move from one t o  the o the r  and then i n s t a n t i a t i n g  t h a t  change sequence i n  a 
f i n a l  output  as a sequence of commands which could be uplinked. 
d i agnos t i c  u n i t ,  i n  c o n t r a s t ,  would respond t o  undes i rab le  states by accept ing  
as input  t he  i n i t i a l  (undesirable)  conf igura t ion .  The d i agnos t i c  u n i t  would 
determine as a r e s u l t  of i t s  ana lys i s  what a s u i t a b l e  f i n a l  conf igu ra t ion  
would be. The i n i t i a l  (undesirable)  and f i n a l  ( d e s i r a b l e )  conf igu ra t ion  would 
be given as input  t o  the  planner.  During i t s  a n a l y t i c  process ,  the  d i agnos t i c  
u n i t  would a l s o  i d e n t i f y  a s e r i e s  of changes required t o  move from the  i n i t i a l  
t o  t h e  f i n a l  s a f e  o r  des i red  s t a t e .  
A PGS has two components--a planner  and a d i agnos t i c  
The 
These changes would probably be a t  a more a b s t r a c t  l e v e l  than a change 
sequence e s t ab l i shed  by t h e  planner. The h i e r a r c h i c a l  planner ,  however, can  
use t h e  a b s t r a c t  sequence of s t a t e  changes from t h e  d i agnos t i c  u n i t  t o  
gene ra t e  t h e  upl inkable ,  executable command sequence. This makes i t  poss ib l e  
t o  use t h e  a b s t r a c t  change sequence (generated a s  output  by the  d i agnos t i c  
u n i t )  as an in te rmedia te  l e v e l  input t o  t h e  planner.  The planner  would use  
t h e  a b s t r a c t  sequence as i f  t he  planner had generated i t  i t s e l f .  
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In summary, the two-phase development strategy is to develop the planner in 
the first stage and develop the diagnostic unit later. This would provide a 
demonstration system at the end of the first phase with the possibility of 
extending it. The diagnostic component would be significantly more 
sophisticated and may not be tractable under the scope of the present 
contract. It would, however, be a highly desirable addition to the system: an 
automated system for space station support would undoubtedly require such a 
capability. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The S a t e l l i t e  Operat ions Support Expert System c o n t r a c t  i s  an  e f f o r t  t o  
i d e n t i f y  aspects of s a t e l l i t e  ground support  a c t i v i t y  a t  Goddard Space F l i g h t  
Center (GSFC) which could p ro f i t ab ly  be automated wi th  a r t i f i c i a l  i n t e l l i g e n c e  
(AI) and t o  develop a f e a s i b i l i t y  demonstration f o  t h e  automation of one such 
area. To accommodate t h e  one year  c o n t r a c t  t i m e  frame, GSFC s e l e c t e d  t h e  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Sun Ear th  Explorer  (ISEE) c o n t r o l  f a c i l i t y  as the  a p p l i c a t i o n  
domain. The t h r e e  s a t e l l i t e s  a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  simple so t h a t  ope ra t iona l  
i n t r i c a c i e s  w i l l  not complicate the development process .  This  i s  t o  a l low t h e  
r e s u l t a n t  system t o  i l l u s t r a t e  the a p p l i c a t i o n  and development of A I  
technology i n  the  s a t e l l i t e  support environment. 
Inves t iga t ion  of t he  ISEE operat ions c e n t e r  revealed s i x  major areas of 
a c t i v i t i e s :  1) telemetry monitoring ( f o r  both experiments and spacec ra f t  
opera t ions) ,  2 )  deciding what ac t ion  t o  t ake  i n  response t o  known problems, 3)  
deciding what a c t i o n  t o  take  f o r  novel problems, 4 )  ground coverage 
scheduling, 5) experiment scheduling, and 6 )  experiment management. These a r e  
discussed i n  d e t a i l  i n  t he  documentation on a p p l i c a t i o n  choices  ( t h e  
de l ive rab le  f o r  t a s k  one) which should be r e f e r r e d  t o  f o r  more information. 
That repor t  ind ica ted  t h a t  almost a l l  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  each of t h e  areas 
could be automated using conventional software.  Procedure genera t ion  and 
command genera t ion  are two exceptions t h a t  were i d e n t i f i e d  i n  t h a t  document. 
When these  were probed more thoroughly it became c l e a r  t h a t  both of them could 
be automated i n  two e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t  ways. One way would use the  shal low 
reasoning approach of a s tandard rule-based system. However, t h e  r u l e s  here  
would be q u i t e  simple and t h e r e  would be l i t t l e  i f  any over lap  between the  
r u l e s  required t o  generate  one procedure ( o r  command sequence) and those  
required t o  genera te  another .  The r e s u l t  would be extremely hardwired and 
have very l i t t l e  substance.  
sof tware.  
Another approach t o  automating the procedure or command genera t ion  process  
would be exceedingly d i f f i c u l t .  I t  would use the  causa l  o r  deep reasoning 
techniques i n  a r t i f i c i a l  i n t e l l i g e n c e  and would r equ i r e  t h e  most d e t a i l e d ,  
i n F r i c a t e  model a v a i l a b l e  of t h e  s t r u c t u r e  and func t ion  of every a spec t  of t h e  
spacec ra f t .  In add i t ion  i t  would have t o  have cons iderable  knowledge of 
physics ,  as t rophys ics ,  e l ec t ron ic s  and t h e  procedure/command language. It 
would have t o  incorpora te  a robust, d ive r se  set of problem solving s t r a t e g i e s  
and methodologies. 
should be done during the  design of a spacec ra f t :  r e t r o f i t t i n g  such a system 
would g ive  r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  benef i t .  The u l t ima te  payoff of t h i s  type of 
system would depend on t h e  longevity and v e r s a t i l i t y  of use of t he  spacec ra f t .  
It  could be achieved r ead i ly  wi th  convent ional  
This would be, i n  s h o r t ,  a complicated p ro jec t  which 
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It is possible  t h a t  A I  could p lay  a r o l e  i n  t h e  execut ive  c o n t r o l  func t ions  of 
a f u l l y  automated c o n t r o l  cen te r .  Had var ious  a c t i v i t i e s  such as monitoring 
a l t e r i n g  and scheduling, been automated, some form of execut ive  c o n t r o l  would 
be required.  The exact  na ture  of t h i s  c o n t r o l  environment i s  not c l e a r .  An 
in-depth operat ions a n a l y s i s  i s  needed t o  determine what c o n t r o l  can be 
achieved through convent ional  sof tware and what w i l l  r equ i r e  a r t i f i c i a l  
i n t e l l i gence .  This  a n a l y s i s  w i l l  be q u i t e  involved and i s  not addressed under 
t h i s  e f f o r t .  We recommend t h a t  a thorough opera t ions  a n a l y s i s  be pursued. W e  
f u r t h e r  suggest t h a t  any f u t u r e  spacec ra f t  and c o n t r o l  c e n t e r s  be designed t o  
inco rpora t e  a l l  f e a s i b l e  automation (convent ional  as w e l l  a s  A I )  t o  e x i s t i n g  
systems. 
A I  may be able t o  p lay  a r o l e  i n  high l e v e l  mission workarounds. 
of a s i g n i f i c a n t  f a i l u r e  of some subsystem o r  component, it may become 
impossible  to  achieve a l l  spacec ra f t  missions.  Executing and schedul ing of 
t he  missions may need t o  be replanned i n  accord wi th  the  reduced resources  Of 
t h e  degraded spacecraf t .  This  replanning could be accomplished by using 
conventional opera t ing  systems scheduling a lgor i thms o r ,  perhaps,  using 
planning techniques developed i n  a r t i f i c i a l  i n t e l l i g e n c e .  
In t h e  event  
The o t h e r  area where a r t i f i c i a l  i n t e l l i g e n c e  could be u s e f u l  i s  i n  t h e  f a u l t  
handling (FH) arena. For some but not a l l  subsystems, FH can pose a complex 
problem. 
use. The f i r s t  i s  through hardware. Hardware i s  o f t e n  designed t o  be 
se l f -cor rec t ing :  t o  i d e n t i f y  f a i l e d  componentry and work around i t ,  perhaps 
by switching t o  redundant components o r  systems. Likewise, on-board sensors  
can be used t o  d e t e c t  a f a u l t  which is then handled from t h e  ground. The 
weight of t h i s  hardware is an  i s sue ,  however. Greater weight means g r e a t e r  
c o s t  i n  resources f o r  launching and c o n t r o l l i n g  a vehic le .  Thus, f o r  example, 
while twelve sensors  might g ive  complete information about a p a r t i c u l a r  
subsystem, only f o u r  might a c t u a l l y  be used. Whether t h i s  we igh t / e f f i c i ency  
compromise continues i n  t h e  f u t u r e  w i l l  depend on advances i n  e l e c t r o n i c s  
technology for  reducing the  s i z e  and weight of sensors ,  ch ips  ana t h e  l i k e .  
With s u f f i c i e n t  advances, f a u l t  handling may be done predominantly i n  hardware 
on-board: much of t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  appears  t o  ex is t  a t  t h i s  t i m e .  
There are  t h r e e  approaches t o  FH, through only two are i n  gene ra l  
The second commonly used means of f a u l t  handling i s  human t roubleshoot ing  from 
the  ground. 
involve t h e  spacecraf t  ana lys t  and, i f  t h e  f a u l t  o r  subsystem i s  complicated 
enough, an  outs ide exper t .  
support  s t a f f  f o r  t he  maintenance of t he  spacec ra f t s .  
Generally used i n  conjunct ion wi th  on-board hardware, t h i s  can 
This can r e s u l t  i n  a cons iderable  t e c h n i c a l  
E-2 
Another, though apparent ly  l i t t l e  used, p o s s i b l i t y  i s  sof tware automation. 
This  can f r equen t ly  be accomplished wi th  convent ional  sof tware:  some c o n t r o l  
c e n t e r s  have d e t a i l e d  f lowcharts  specifying the  algori thm f o r  i s o l a t i n g  f a u l t s  
i n  var ious subsystems. 
i d e n t i f i e d .  These symptoms a c t  as  cues  f o r  using one of t h e  a lgor i thms.  A 
f e w  subsystems appear t o  be more complex and may merit the  use of AI 
technology. It must be s t r e s s e d ,  however, t h a t  the  u t i l i t y  of any sof tware  
automation of f a u l t  handling must be assessed  i n  l i g h t  of t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
f o r  performing t h e  func t ion  on board i n  hardware. 
I n  these  cen te r s  f a u l t  symptoms have been thoroughly 
For t h i s  con t r ac t ,  w e  have proposed developing a demonstration f a u l t  handling 
system f o r  a hydrazine propuls ion system (HPS). This  appears  t o  be a r a t h e r  
gene r i c  problem. Hydrazine systems are t h e  most common monopropellant 
blowdown propuls ion system (MBPS) and MBPSs are one of t he  most common 
propuls ion mechanisms on spacecraf t .  The s t r u c t u r e  of MBPSs i s  q u i t e  uniform 
ac ross  spacecraf t .  Despi te  t h e i r  lower e f f i c i e n c y ,  hydrazine systems w i l l  be 
used on f u t u r e  spacec ra f t ,  due t o  t h e i r  economy and weight,  and are a l i k e l y  
candida te  f o r  use i n  space s t a t ion .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e  HPS i s  one of t h e  more 
complex subsystems on ISEE and should be s u f f i c i e n t  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  some AI 
concept s . 
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11. General In t roduct ion  t o  Hvdrazine Systems 
In t roduct ion:  Hydrazine systems are the  most common monopropellant blowdown 
systems i n  u s e  on spacec ra f t  today. Hydrazine systems have been used on a 
number of spacecraf t  a t  Goddard Space F l i g h t  Center (GSFC), inc luding  the  
In t e rna t iona l  Sun Ear th  Explorer  ( I S E E ) .  
hydrazine sys tems seems assured.  
As mentioned above, f u r t h e r  u s e  of 
Reasons f o r  the common use of hydrazine inc lude :  
o It i s  a s t o r a b l e  l i q u i d  monopropellant. 
o It i s  compatible with many materials. 
o It i s  shock and f r i c t i o n  i n s e n s i t i v e .  
o It i s  a s t a b l e  l i q u i d  ( s a f e l y  heated t o  500°F) 
o It has s a f e ,  simple handling procedures. 
o It i s  an inexpensive f u e l .  
o It i s  f l i g h t  t e s t e d .  
o It can withstand long and shor t  j e t  f i r i n g s .  
o It does l i t t l e  o r  no damage t o  s c i e n t i f i c  equipment. 
Purpose of Hydrazine Systems: The gene ra l  purpose of hydrazine systems i s  t o  
perform a t t i t u d e  c o n t r o l  func t ions .  The func t ions  performed by the  hydrazine 
system on, for  example, IUE are: 
o Notation con t ro l .  
o Control of t he  precess ion  of t he  s p i n  a x i s .  
o Spin of t h e  spacec ra f t .  
o Spacecraft  torquing t o  acqui re  t h e  proper  sun ang le  i n  t h e  event  of 
a t t i t u d e  loss .  
Velocity c o r r e c t i o n  f o r  east-west s t a t i o n  keeping (Delta-V). 
. o Velocity c o r r e c t i o n  t o  i n i t i a l l y  acqu i r e  t h e  o r b i t  s t a t i o n .  
o 
o Spacecraft  torquing t o  unload r e a c t i o n  wheels. 
P rope r t i e s  of Hydrazine: 
are : 
Some chemical and phys ica l  p r o p e r t i e s  of hydrazine 
0 
0 
The chemical equat ion f o r  hydrazine i s  N2H4. 
Hydrazine i s  a c o l o r l e s s  l i q u i d  wi th  phys ica l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  similar 
t o  water.  
Molecular weight 32. 
Freezing poin t  34.5 OF. 
Boiling poin t  235.4"F. 
Spec i f ic  g r a v i t y  1.008 @ 68°F. 
Vapor pressure  0.2 p s i a  @ 68°F. 
Hydrazine decomposes i n t o  hydrogen and n i t rogen  a t  high temperatures  
( a t  s l i g h t l y  lower temperatures hydrazine decomposes i n t o  hydrogen, 
ni t rogen and ammonia "3). 
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Functioning of Hydrazine Systems: Hydrazine systems func t ion  by pushing 
hydrazine f u e l  from s to rage  tanks down t o  a series of t h r u s t e r s .  The f u e l  
l i n e s  are interconnected by a s e r i e s  of l a t c h  valves  designed t o  minimize the  
e f f e c t s  of valve f a i l u r e s .  The hydrazine f u e l ,  when i t  reaches an engine,  
passes over  a heated c a t a l y s t  bed. The hydrazine expands t o  form a hot  gas .  
This  gas i s  expel led  out t h e  engine nozzle providing the  t h r u s t  used i n  
performing some maneuver ( s e e  Figure 1). 
Components making up a hydrazine system: The hydrazine system t o  be used i n  
the  demonstration (shown in Figure 2) con ta ins :  
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Eight  p rope l l an t  tanks.  
F i l l l v e n t  valves  f o r  both groups of f o u r  tanks.  
F i l l l d r a i n  valves  f o r  both groups of fou r  tanks.  
Three pressure  sensors .  
Six f u e l  l i n e  f i l t e r s .  
Seven l a t c h  valves.  
Twe 1 ve hea t  e rs . 
Twenty-f ou r  temperature sensors.  
Twelve c a t a l y s t  beds. 
Twelve engine valves.  
Propel lan t  tanks:  The propel lant  tanks s t o r e  t h e  hydrazine f u e l  used 
throughout t h e  l i f e  of the  spacecraf t .  The p rope l l an t  tanks  a r e  usua l ly  
grouped pairwise in orde r  t o  maintain t h e  s p i n  balance of t h e  c r a f t .  
There are two bas i c  designs for  t h e  f u e l  tanks :  1 )  a bladder  system and 2 )  
a gas p rope l l an t  system. ISEE has  t h e  b ladder  system. In t h e  bladder  
system a t h i n  membrane separates  t he  hydrazine from a p res su r i z ing  gas  
(usua l ly  H e ) .  
p ressurant  s i d e  of t h e  bladder with t h e  p re s su r i z ing  gas .  The gas  
propel lan t  system works bas i ca l ly  l i k e  a spray  can. 
i s  i n j e c t e d  i n t o  t h e  tank  w i t h  t he  hydrazine f u e l .  The gas  and the  f u e l  
do not mix and t h e  pressurant  fo rces  t h e  hydrazine f u e l  along t h e  s i d e s  of 
the  f u e l  tank and through a f i l ter  designed t o  keep the  pressurant  and 
f u e l  separa te .  
The pressure  in t h e  tank  i s  r a i sed  by f i l l i n g  t h e  
The p res su r i z ing  gas  
F i l l / v e n t  valves:  The f i l l / v e n t  valves  a r e  used t o  f i l l  and vent t h e  
pressurant  t o  t h e  f u e l  tank.  
mission t o  f i l l  t he  f u e l  tank wi th  pressurant .  
The f i l l / v e n t  valve is used before  the  
F i l l l d r a i n  valve:  The f i l l l d r a i n  valves  are used t o  f i l l  t h e  f u e l  tanks  
wi th  hydrazine before  launch. 
Fuel l i n e s :  
propuls ion system. To reduce weight, t h e  f u e l  l i n e s  are  made of t i t an ium 
wi th  s t a i n l e s s  s teel  j o i n t s .  
The f u e l  l i n e s  connect a l l  components making up t h e  
Fuel f i l ters :  F i l t e r s  are placed in t h e  f u e l  l i n e s  t o  prevent p a r t i c l e s  
from i n t e r f e r i n g  wi th  the  funct ion of t h e  l a t c h  valves ,  engine valves  and 
c a t a l y s t  beds. F i l t e r s  a r e  located a f t e r  each f u e l  tank and before  each 
valve.  If a particle reaches e i t h e r  an engine valve o r  a l a t c h  valve it 
could prevent t he  valve from closing properly.  This  would r e s u l t  in f u e l  
leaking through the  seat of the  valve. 
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Latch valves: Latch va lves  sepa ra t e  s e c t i o n s  of t h e  f u e l  l i n e s  and f u e l  
tanks.  Latch va lves  are commanded t o  be i n  one of two states:  open o r  
c losed.  Once commanded a l a t c h  valve s t a y s  i n  t h e  commanded s t a t e  u n t i l  
i t  i s  given another  command (e.g. ,  i f  a l a t c h  valve i s  commanded t o  ope* 
i t  w i l l  remain open u n t i l  i t  i s  commanded t o  c l o s e ) .  
Heaters: 
f o r  HPS. E l e c t r i c a l  h e a t e r s  are provided t o  t h e  f u e l  tanks  and t o  the  
f u e l  l i nes  t o  a s su re  t h a t  t h e  hydrazine f u e l  does not  f r e e z e  r e s u l t i n g  i n  
damage t o  t h e  system. Heaters are a l s o  provided f o r  t h e  c a t a l y s t  beds i n  
o rde r  t o  maintain temperatures  t h a t  a l low t h e  c a t a l y s t  t o  act more 
e f f i c i e n t l y .  
So la r  hea t ing  i s  intended t o  be t h e  primary source of hea t ing  
Engine valves: The engine valves  are loca ted  before  t h e  c a t a l y s t  bed of 
each th rus t e r .  It i s  through these  valves  t h a t  t he  f i r i n g  of t he  
t h r u s t e r s  i s  con t ro l l ed .  The engine valve i s  a solenoid which i s  
commanded t o  open. 
per iod of t i m e  and then c loses .  Thus, commanding an  engine t o  maintain 
i t s  thrus t  r equ i r e s  sending a stream of open commands t o  t h e  engine valve.  
Pressure sensors:  
tanks.  
Once commanded the  engine valve opens f o r  a s h o r t  
Pressure  sensors  are loca ted  a f t e r  each set of f u e l  
These p re s su re  guages have an accuracy range of 2 1%. 
Cata lys t  bed: 
405). 
c a p i l l a r y  tubes  connected t o  the  f u e l  l i n e .  
The c a t a l y t i c  agent  i n  t h e  c a t a l y s t  bed i s  I r id ium ( S h e l l  
The c a t a l y s t  bed i s  fed  with hydrazine through a c l u s t e r  of 
Heat sensors:  Heat sensors  are loca ted  on each f u e l  tank  and a f t e r  each 
l a t c h  or engine valve. There i s  a l s o  'a hea t  sensor  on each c a t a l y s t  bed. 
The purpose of t he  sensors  on t h e  f u e l  tanks  and valves  i s  t o  monitor t he  
temperature of rhe hydrazine f u e l .  The temperature sensors  on the  
c a t a l y s t  beds al low f o r  monitoring t h e  c a t a l y s t  bed temperature  t o  a s s u r e  
t h a t  they are opera t ing  e f f i c i e n t l y .  The hea t  sensors  have an  accuracy 
range of + 2%. - 
Telemetry data: There are a number of te lemetry s t reams g iv ing  information 
about t he  hea l th  of the  hydrazine system: 
o Fuel l i n e  pressure  da ta .  A numeric value represent ing  the  pressure  
i n  the  f u e l  l i n e .  
o Latch valve sensor  da ta .  A value f o r  each l a t c h  valve showing i f  t h e  
valve i s  opened or c losed .  
o Engine valve sensor  da ta .  A value  f o r  each engine valve showing if 
t h e  v a i v e  i s  opened o r  ciosed. 
o Heater temperature gauge da ta .  A numeric value f o r  each sensor  which 
shows the  temperature a t  that po in t  i n  the  system. 
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o Cata lys t  bed temperature da t a .  A numeric value showing t h e  
temperature of a c a t a l y s t  bed. 
o Engine valve temperature da t a .  A numeric value showing t h e  
temperature of an engine valve. 
o At t i t ude  d a t a .  Data r e f l e c t i n g  t h e . p o s i t i o n  of t he  s p a c e c r a f t .  
I f  less o r  g r e a t e r  than expected, t h i s  d a t a  may s i g n a l  a 
malfunction i n  the  propulsion system. 
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111. F a u l t s  and The i r  Workarounds 
W e  w i l l  handle hydrazine system f a i l u r e s  which correspond t o  the  f a i l u r e  of an 
ind iv idua l  system component. 
t e lemet ry  data received from the  spacec ra f t .  
F a i l u r e s  i n  the  system must be i n f e r r e d  from 
F a i l u r e s  tha t  could occur in a s tandard hydrazine propuls ion system a r e :  
o Leak in t h e  hydrazine s to rage  tank. 
o Leak in a s e c t i o n  of t he  l i n e .  
o Fa i lu re  of a l a t c h  valve t o  open. 
o Fa i lure  of a l a t c h  valve t o  c l o s e .  
o Fa i lure  of an engine valve t o  open. 
o Fai lure  of an  engine valve t o  c l o s e .  
o Fa i lu re  of a h e a t e r  t o  tu rn  o f f .  
o Fa i lure  of a h e a t e r  t o  t u r n  on. 
o Fai lure  of a c a t a l y s t  bed. 
Some of t he  f a u l t s  l i s t e d  below have overlapping symptoms. Also, i n  some 
cases  it may be impossible t o  narrow a f a u l t  down t o  a s i n g l e  component. 
example, a clogged f i l t e r  and a f a i l i n g  c a t a l y s t  bed can g ive  t h e  same 
symptoms. 
For  
Fau l t s ,  symptoms and t h e i r  workarounds. 
FAULT : Leak i n  the  hydrazine f u e l  tank.  
SYMPTOMS : 0 Loss of pressure  i n  t h e  f u e l  l i n e .  
o Engine t h r u s t  r e s u l t s  i n  obta in ing  l e s s  a t t i t u d e  
co r rec t ion  than expected. 
o Cata lys t  bed and engine valve temperatures  lower than 
expected. 
WORKAROUND: Vent t he  f u e l  ou t s ide  t h e  spacec ra f t  by using the  t h r u s t e r s .  
The t h r u s t e r s  are used t o  prevent  t h e  f u e l  from harming the  
spacecraf t .  
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FAULT : Leak i n  a sec t ion  of t he  f u e l  l i n e .  
SYMPTOMS : o Engine thrus t  r e s u l t s  i n  obta in ing  less a t t i t u d e  
co r rec t ion  than expected. 
o A lower pressure i n  t h e  f u e l  l i n e s  than expected. 
o A lower pressure i n  the  f u e l  tanks .  
o Ca ta lys t  bed and engine valve temperatures  less than 
expected. 
WORKAROUND: The workaround is  t o  shut  of f  t he  p a r t  of t h e  system con- 
t a i n i n g  the  leak. This  i s  done by c l o s i n g  t h e  l a t c h  va lve ,  
o r  l a t c h  valves, immediately above t h e  leak.  
FAULT : Fa i lu re  of t he  upper-level l a t c h  valve t o  c lose .  
SYMPTOMS : o Engine th rus t  r e s u l t s  i n  obta in ing  more a t t i t u d e  cor- 
r e c t i o n  than expected ( i f  lower l e v e l  l a t c h  va lves  are  
open). 
o Sensor f o r  t h e - l a t c h  valve i n d i c a t e s  t h e  valve i s  open. 
o Cata lys t  bed and engine valve temperatures  g r e a t e r  
than expected ( i f  lower-level valves  are open). 
WORKAROUND: The workaround i s  t o  shut  the  l a t c h  va lve  immediately above 
t h i s  l a t c h  valve. Fuel can be sen t  through t h i s  l i n e  with 
some r i s k  of causing a pressure  sp ike  ( o r  water hammer) 
when hydrazine passes through the  open valve.  
sp ike  could damage t h e  valve,  p ressure  sensors  o r  f u e l  tank  
bladder  membrane. 
A pressure  
' FAULT: Fa i lu re  of t he  lower-level l a t c h  valve t o  c lose .  
SYMPTOMS : o Sensor fo r  t he  l a t c h  valve i n d i c a t e s  the  valve i s  open. 
WORKAROUND: The workaround in t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  i s  t o  opera te  t h e  system 
normally as long as the  f u e l  i n  t h e  reg ion  i s  i n t a c t .  
FAULT : 
SYMPTOMS : o Engine thrus t  r e s u l t s  i n  obta in ing  no a t t i t u d e  cor- 
F a i l u r e  of a upper-level o r  lower-level l a t c h  valve t o  open. 
r e c t i o n  or  less than expected. 
o Sensor f o r  t he  l a t c h  valve i n d i c a t e s  t he  va lve  4 s  
closed.  
o Low temperature f o r  t h e  c a t a l y s t  bed and engine valve.  
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WORKAROUND: The e f f e c t  of t h i s  f a u l t  is  t o  f u n c t i o n a l l y  c u t  of f  t he  
s e c t i o n  of t h e  system below the  s tuck  valve.  I f  a redun- 
dant  f u e l  l i n e  i s  a v a i l a b l e  i t  should be used. I f  a redun- 
dant  f u e l  l i n e  i s  not a v a i l a b l e  t h i s  p a r t  of t he  system has  
l o s t  i t s  f u n c t i o n a l i t y .  
FAULT : F a i l u r e  of t he  engine valve t o  c l o s e .  
SYMPTOMS : o Engine t h r u s t  r e s u l t s  i n  obta in ing  more a t t i t u d e  than 
expected ( t h r u s t e r s  w i l l  f i r e  as long as t h e r e  i s  an  
open l i n e  t o  one of t h e  f u e l  tanks) .  
o Sensor i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  engine valve i s  open. 
o Temperatures f o r  engine valve and c a t a l y s t  bed h igher  
than expected. 
WORKAROUND: Shut off  t h e  l a t c h  valve immediately above t h e  engine valve. 
U s e  a redundant set of t h r u s t e r s .  I f  a redundant set of 
t h r u s t e r s  i s  not a v a i l a b l e  t h i s  set may be used wi th  a 
g r e a t l y  reduced c o n t r o l  over  t h e  t h r u s t .  
FAULT : F a i l u r e  of t h e  engine valve t o  open. 
SYMPTOMS : o Engine t h r u s t  r e s u l t s  i n  obta in ing  no a t t i t u d e  cor-  
r e c t i o n  o r  less than  expected. 
o Sensor f o r  t he  engine valve i n d i c a t e s  t he  va lve  i s  
closed.  
o Low temperature i n  t h e  c a t a l y s t  bed and engine valve 
( i . e . ,  t h e  t h r u s t e r  is  not f i r i n g ) .  
WORKAROUND: This  f a u l t  makes i t  impossible  t o  use t h e  t h r u s t e r s  
assoc ia ted  with t h i s  engine valve.  Repeated a t tempts  t o  
command t h e  valve open may eventua l ly  succeed. Otherwise a 
redundant set of t h r u s t e r s  must be used. 
FAUtT : F a i l u r e  of fue l - l i ne  h e a t e r  t o  t u r n  o f f .  
SYMPTOM : o Heater sensor  i n d i c a t e s  h igh  temperature .  
~~~ ~ 
o Engine t h r u s t  r e s u l t s  i n  obta in ing  less a t t i t u d e  than 
expected ( i f  the  temperature  of t h e  l i n e  i s  g r e a t  
enough t o  break t h e  f u e l  down i n t o  hydrogen, n i t rogen  
and ammonia). 
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o Low temperature i n  t h e  c a t a l y s t  bed and engine valve 
( t h i s  i s  the r e s u l t  of t h e  t h r u s t e r s  not  f i r i n g  
e f f i c i e n t l y  due t o  t h e  breakdown of t h e  f u e l ) .  
WORKAROUND: D o  no t  use t h i s  p a r t  of t he  system as long as the  tempera- 
t u r e  i s  high enough t o  break down t h e  hydrazine.  I f  t h e  
hydrazine decomposes i n t o  i t s  component gases  the  
e f f i c i e n c y  of t h r u s t e r  burns w i l l  be reduced because of gas  
bubbles i n  the  f u e l  l i nes .  
FAULT : F a i l u r e  of a fue l - l ine  h e a t e r  t o  t u r n  on. 
SYMPTOMS : o Heater sensor i n d i c a t e s  low temperature.  
o Engine th rus t  r e s u l t s  i n  obta in ing  less a t t i t u d e  and 
c a t a l y s t  bed and engine valve temperature lower than 
expected. This  l o s s  of t h r u s t  i s  due t o  hydrazine 
f r eez ing  i n  t h e  f u e l  l i n e  and e i t h e r  completely clog- 
ging the  l i n e  o r  r e s t r i c t i n g  the  flow of f u e l .  
WORKAROUND: I f  t h e  l i n e  does not  f r eeze ,  then no workaround i s  needed. 
If t h e  l i n e  does f r e e z e ,  two workarounds are poss ib l e :  1) 
bathe the  spacecraf t  i n - t h e  sun t o  hea t  t h e  f u e l  l i n e  o r  2) 
use a redundant p a r t  of t h e  system. 
FAULT: ' F a i l u r e  of catalyst-bed h e a t e r  t o  t u r n  o f f .  
SYMPTOM : 0 High c a t a l y s t  bed temperature.  
o High temperature i n  the  engine valve. 
o Lowered engine t h r u s t :  t h e  r e s u l t  of hydrazine break- 
ing  down before the  engine valve and mixing gas  with 
the  hydrazine f u e l .  
WORKAROUND: I f  t h e  temperature g e t s  too hot then heat  could t r a n s f e r  
ac ross  t h e  manifold causing the  hydrazine f u e l  t o  break 
i n t o  i t s  component gases .  This w i l l  degrade the  
performance of t he  t h r u s t e r .  The workaround would be t o  
use a redundant set of t h r u s t e r s ,  i f  they are ava i l ab le .  
If t h e  redundant set of t h r u s t e r s  i s  not a v a i l a b l e ,  then 
the  degraded performance w i l l  have t o  be accepted.  
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FAULT : F a i l u r e  of a catalyst-bed h e a t e r  t o  t u r n  on. 
SYMPTOMS : o Low c a t a l y s t  bed temperature.  
o Engine valve temperature could be lower than expected 
and engine t h r u s t  could r e s u l t  i n  ob ta in ing  l e s s  a t t i -  
tude than expected. The lower temperature and l o s s  o f  
t h r u s t  i s  due t o  hydrazine not i g n i t i n g  as e f f i c i e n t l y  
as i t  would a t  a h igher  temperature.  
WORKAROUND: Two workarounds are poss ib le :  1) bathe t h e  spacec ra f t  i n  
t he  sun t o  hea t  t h e  c a t a l y s t  bed o r  2)  use  a redundant p a r t  
of t he  system. 
FAULT : F a i l u r e  of t he  c a t a l y s t  bed. 
SYMPTOMS : o At t i t ude  change less than expected. 
o Low temperature i n  the  c a t a l y s t  bed (due t o  lower 
r e a c t i o n  rate of t h e  hydrazine).  
WORKAROUND: Use redundant set of t h r u s t e r s ,  i f  poss ib l e .  I f  a redun- 
dant  set of t h r u s t e r s  i s  not a v a i l a b l e  then  t h e  reduced 
t h r u s t  must be accepted as a permanent c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of 
t h e  system. 
Other system f a i l u r e s  which could m i m i c  a hydrazine fa . i lu re :  Some symp- 
toms of hydrazine f a i l u r e s  which could be mimicked by o t h e r  systems on 
. spacecraf t  are: 
o Sensor f a i l u r e  (e.g. ,  t h e  sensor  could represent  a valve as  
being closed when i n  f a c t  i t  i s  open). 
o On board computer (OBC) malfunct ion (e .g . ,  t h e  OBC could send 
down i n c o r r e c t  te lemet ry  d a t a ) .  (Not an  ISEE problem.) 
o Gyro f a i l u r e  ( r e s u l t s  i n  unexpected a t t i t u d e  change). (Not an  
ISEE problem. ) 
o Wheel d r i v e r  assembly ( r e s u l t  i n  an unexpected a t t i t u d e  change). 
(Not an ISEE problem.) 
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Ill. System Configurat ion 
The proposed system conta ins  f i v e  major modules, a s  i l l u s t r a t e d :  a n  execu- 
t i v e ,  I / O ,  subsystem model, telemetry gene ra to r ,  and f a u l t  handler .  The con- 
cep tua l  f low through t h e  system i s  a s  fol lows:  t h e  1/0 module p re sen t s  t o  t h e  
use r  a menu of op t ions  which he uses t o  spec i fy  the type and l o c a t i o n  of a 
f a u l t .  For any given test  o r  demonstration t h e  system w i l l  be capable  of 
handling one f a u l t .  The execut ive passes t h i s  t o  t h e  model module, which 
a d j u s t s  t h e  i n t e r n a l  representa t ion  of t h e  HPS appropr i a t e ly .  The te lemet ry  
genera tor  then uses t h i s  i n t e r n a l  r ep resen ta t ion  t o  produce te lemet ry  which is 
passed t o  t h e  f a u l t  handling component. The l a t t e r  uses  i t s  i s o l a t i o n  tech- 
niques t o  l o c a t e  t h e  f a i l u r e  and determines a method of handling i t .  This  
w i l l  gene ra l ly  involve changing the s ta te  of subsystem components i n  t h e  
model, e.g., opening and c los ing  l a t c h  va lves  and observing t h e  response.  
These changes are presented t o  the u s e r  t e x t u a l l y  and are r e f l e c t e d  i n  
normalized telemetry da ta .  Once i d e n t i f i e d ,  the  na ture  of the  f a u l t  and i t s  
workaround are presented t o  t h e  user. 
Executive: The execut ive  monitors and coord ina tes  t h e  o v e r a l l  f low of 
c o n t r o l  through the  system. 
- I / O :  The 1 /0  module is  responsible  f o r  t h e  man-machine i n t e r f a c e .  
a l lows t h e  use r  t o  spec i fy  the type and l o c a t i o n  of a f a u l t  and d i s p l a y s  
t h i s  on t h e  screen. 
t h e  f a i l u r e ,  t h e  u s e r  w i l l  be given a d e s c r i p t i o n  of t he  i s o l a t i o n  process .  
Once t h e  f a u l t  i s  loca ted  i t s  na ture  and workaround will be presented t o  
t h e  user .  
It 
As t h e  f a u l t  handling module progress ive ly  l o c a l i z e s  
Model: The model component maintains an i n t e r n a l  r ep resen ta t ion  of t he  
s t r u c t u r e  and func t ion  of t h e  HPS. It modif ies  the  cu r ren t  s t a t u s  of t h e  
model in accord wi th  t h e  f a u l t s  s p e c i f i e d  by t h e  use r  and t h e  probing 
a c t i o n s  and workaround suggestions of t h e  f a u l t  handling module. 
Telemetry Generator: The telemetry genera t ion  module provides  simulated 
telemetry da ta  t o  the  f a u l t  handling component. From i t s  understanding of 
how telemetry source po in t s  vary under normal and f a u l t y  condi t ions ,  t h i s  
produces telemetry d a t a  appropriate  t o  the  cu r ren t  s t a t e  of t h e  HPS, as  
indica ted  by t h e  i n t e r n a l  model. 
F a u l t  Handling Module: The f a u l t  handling module (FHM) d e t e c t s  and 
i s o l a t e s  f a i l u r e s  based on the te lemet ry  d a t a  produced by the  t e l eme t ry  
genera tor ,  and i d e n t i f i e s  workaround s t r a t e g i e s .  The FHM i s  t he  only por- 
t i o n  of t h e  system that uses  a r t i f i c i a l  i n t e l l i g e n c e  technology. 
Telemetry da ta  i s  processed by a convent ional  monitoring and a l e r t i n g  sub- 
module f o r  de t ec t ing  exception events ,  i .e.,  f a u l t s .  The remainder of t h e  
module's processing fol lows the s tandard  production system format. 
c a t i o n s  of the  i d e n t i f i e d  f a i l u r e s  are i n s e r t e d  i n t o  "working memory". 
The " r u l e  base" encodes a s t ra ight forward  algori thm t h a t  i s  used f o r  
i s o l a t i n g  f a i l u r e s .  The workaround emerges as an immediate consequence of 
having i s o l a t e d  t h e  f a u l t :  there  is, i n  genera l ,  a s i n g l e  opt ion.  
Indi-  
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The process of l o c a t i n g  t h e  f a u l t  g e n e r a l l y  involves  opening and c los ing  
va lves  a t  var ious  p o i n t s  a long t h e  hydrazine l i n e s .  These changes . a re  
e f f e c t e d  i n  the  model, which r e s u l t s  i n  changes i n  t h e  te lemet ry  d a t a  pro- 
duced by t h e  te lemet ry  generator .  The new te lemet ry  d a t a  i s  fed  back t o  
t h e  FHM which can then assess the  consequence of i t s  probing a c t i o n  and 
can choose t h e  appropr i a t e  p a r t  of t he  a lgor i thm t o  use next .  
As t h e  FHM probes,  i t  p rogres s ive ly  e l imina te s  po r t ions  of t h e  HPS a s  
candidates  €o r  conta in ing  the  f a i l u r e .  This  reduct ion  i n  sea rch  space can 
be presented t e x t u a l l y  t o  t h e  u s e r ' s  s c reen  by t h e  1/0 module. 
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V. Summary 
The purpose of t h i s  Sa t e l l i t e  Ground Support Expert System c o n t r a c t  i s  t o  
i l l u s t r a t e  some a r t i f i c i a l  i n t e l l i g e n c e  concepts in t h e  s a t e l l i t e  ground sup- 
po r t  domain. Faul t  handling has been i d e n t i f i e d  a s  an aspect of ground sup- 
po r t  which might b e n e f i t  from automation v ia  A I .  
system has been chosen as the  app l i ca t ion  f o r  f a u l t  handl ing as i t  a p p e a r s  
s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  t he  above purpose. 
a s p e c t s  of r u l e  based systems, which w i l l  account f o r  15-20% of t h e  code f o r  
t h e  en t i re  demonstration system. 
t h e  system f o r  demonstration by November 1984. 
A hydrazine propuls ion 
W e  w i l l  be a b l e  t o  demonstrate some simple 
We in tend  t o  proceed wi th  t h e  development of 
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APPENDIX F 
Software Design Documentation 
c 
SOFTWARE DESIGN DOCUMENTATION - DRAFT 
In t roduc t ion  
Under the  S a t e l l i t e  Operations Support Expert System, w e  a r e  developing a 
demonstration system t o  perform automated f a u l t  handling f o r  hydrazine 
propuls ion  systems (HPS). This  system c o n s i s t s  of s i x  major components: t h e  
execut ive ,  t h e  1/0 module, the  exposure module, t he  propuls ion system model, 
t h e  te lemet ry  genera tor ,  and t h e  f a u l t  handler .  A l l  but t he  last  of 
these--the f a u l t  handler--are considered support ing sof tware and w i l l  be 
documented i n  t h i s  repor t .  The f a u l t  handler  i s  e f f e c t i v e l y  t h e  knowledge 
base of t h i s  system, and i n  accordance wi th  the  c o n t r a c t ,  w i l l  be documented 
under a sepa ra t e  cover. 
. System Overview 
The o v e r a l l  flow of con t ro l  through t h e  program is d i rec t ed  by t h e  execut ive.  
Af t e r  i n i t i a l i z a t i o n  of t he  program environment, the execut ive i s  invoked. It 
ca l l s  a p a r t  of the  1/0 module which q u e r i e s  t h e  use r  f o r  a choice  of 
propuls ion system conf igura t ion ,  f a u l t  type,  and f a u l t  l oca t ion .  Choice of 
conf igu ra t ion  e n t a i l s  i den t i fy ing  o r  cons t ruc t ing  a model of t h e  propuls ion 
system f o r  i n t e r n a l  use by the  system. If  t h e  u s e r  selects t h e  conf igu ra t ion  
from ISEE o r  IUE,  t h e  appropr ia te  model i s  loaded from a f i l e .  Otherwise, i t  
i s  cons t ruc ted  as t h e  u s e r  spec i f i e s  t h e  components and s t r u c t u r e .  When t h e  
f a u l t  i s  se l ec t ed ,  t he  system's i n t e r n a l  model of t h e  HPS i s  modified 
accordingly f o r  use by the  telemetry gene ra to r  and f a u l t  handler .  
The executive.  then ca l l s  t h e  exposure module which examines t h e  f a u l t . s e l e c t e d  
i n  t h e  contex t  of t h e  configurat ion and determines what s t a t e  t h e  propuls ion 
system should.be i n  t o  cause t h e  f a u l t  t o  in f luence  i t s  operat ion.  This  i s  a 
state i n  which symptoms w i l l  appear i n  t h e  te lemet ry  stream as abnormal o r  
unexpected values.  The exposure module i d e n t i f i e s  how t h e  HPS should be 
"commanded" t o  move i n t o  that s t a t e  and r e t u r n s  a set of command a c t i o n s  t o  
the  execut ive.  
The execut ive  processes  these  ac t ions  by modifying the  i n t e r n a l  model 
appropr i a t e ly ,  informing the  u s e r  of t h e  a c t i o n s  taken, and c a l l i n g  the  
te lemet ry  generator .  As discussed below, t h e  te lemetry genera tor  produces 
te lemet ry  t o  r e f l e c t  t he  cu r ren t  s t a t e  of t h e  HPS. The te lemet ry  i s  d isp layed  
t o  t h e  use r  and examined f o r  unexpected values  by a d i s t r i b u t e d  monitoring 
system embedded i n  the  te lemetry generator .  Any unexpected va lues  are 
reported t o  t h e  f a u l t  handling module (FHM) both q u a n t i t a t i v e l y  (e .g . ,  
" c a t a l y s t  bed temperature 850"") and q u a l i t a t i v e l y  (e.g. ,  " c a t a l y s t  bed 
temperature i s  higher  than expected"). 
The FHM is a rule-based module which, as mentioned above, w i l l  be documented 
under sepa ra t e  cover.  Br i e f ly ,  i t  i d e n t i f i e s  candida te  pathways through t h e  
HPS, on which the  f a u l t  might l i e  and searches  those pathways, commanding 
va lves  t o  open and c l o s e  and t h r u s t e r s  t o  f i r e .  
t h e  l o c a t i o n  of t he  f a u l t  from the consequences of these  a c t i o n s ,  i .e.,  from 
the  te lemet ry  values  produced a f t e r  t h e  a c t i o n  i s  e f fec t ed .  Once t h e  f a u l t  i s  
loca ted ,  t he  FHM i d e n t i f i e s  and e f f e c t s  a workaround. Where appropr i a t e ,  
t h e s e  a c t i o n s  and t h e i r  motivations are descr ibed  t o  the  user .  
It draws conclusions about 
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When t h e  workaround has  been implemented and telemetry has  normalized, t he  
use r  is  given t h r e e  opt ions :  
a )  t o  end the  se s s ion ;  
b) t o  run another  demonstration on t he  same o r  d i f f e r e n t  conf igu ra t ion  
beginning from normal f a u l t - f r e e  HPS opera t ion ;  
c )  t o  run another  demonstration on t h e  same conf igura t ion ,  beginning i n  
i t s  c u r r e n t ,  "degraded" s ta te--retaining t h e  o r i g i n a l  f a u l t  and i t s  
workaround and adding a second f a u l t .  
In a ) ,  t h e  program terminates. I n  e i t h e r  b) o r  c) ,  once the  conf igu ra t ion  
and f a u l t  are known, t h e  process  proceeds as above. 
The Executive 
The execut ive i s  a s t ra ight forward  c o n t r o l l i n g  program which f eeds  information 
between subordinate  modules. It i s  invoked t o  coord ina te  each t r i a l ,  a l lowing 
f o r  r e i n i t i a l i z a t i o n  between t r i a l s  a s  appropr ia te .  
module t o  e s t a b l i s h  the  u s e r ' s  choice of HPS conf igura t ions ,  f a u l t  type,  and 
f a u l t  loca t ion .  I t  uses  the  information returned t o  modify the  i n t e r n a l  HPS 
model. 
how t o  expose t h e  f a u l t ,  i .e.,  how t o  "command the  spacecraf t"  so t h a t  
symptoms of t he  f a u l t  w i l l  appear i n  the  telemetry. The exposure module 
r e t u r n s  a set of command a c t i o n s  which t h e  execut ive  processes  by 1 )  modifying 
t h e  model ( i . e . ,  changing t h e  s t a t e  of t h e  HPS); 2) informing t h e  u s e r ;  and 
t h e  3) c a l l i n g  the  te lemetry generat ion module. 
It  f i r s t  c a l l s  t he  T / O  
It passes  t h e  same information t o  the  exposure module which determines 
A f t e r  producing and d isp lay ing  new te lemetry values ,  t he  te lemet ry  gene ra to r  
r e t u r n s  a list of unexpected values. The execut ive sends these  t o  the  f a u l t  
handling module. A t  var ious points ,  t h e  FHM w i l l  send back t o  the  execut ive  
commands t o  a l ter  t h e  state of the  HPS. The execut ive  handles these  a s  i t  
does t h e  commands from the exposure module: modifying the  model, informing 
t h e  user ,  and c a l l i n g  the  telemetry genera tor .  New te lemet ry  i s  produced and 
the  r e s u l t s  cycled back t o  t h e  f a u l t  handler ,  by the  execut ive.  When t h e  
f a u l t  has been loca ted  and a workaround e f f ec t ed ,  t he  execut ive  r e t u r n s  
c o n t r o l  t o  the  i n i t i a l i z i n g  program. 
The InDut/OutDut Module 
The 1/0 module provides  the  means whereby t h e  use r  i n t e r a c t s  wi th  t h e  
demonstration system. There are three primary veh ic l e s  f o r  t h i s :  menus, 
g raphics ,  and t e x t u a l  presentat ions.  
Menus are used f o r  input  t o  the  systems. The configurat ion-choice menu al lows 
t h e  u s e r  t o  choose t h e  HPS conf igura t ion  from ISEE 'or IUE o r  t o  create a new 
one. 
number of f u e l  tanks,  l a t c h  valves,  engine valves ,  and c a t a l y s t  beds along 
wi th  t h e i r  s t r u c t u r a l  re la t ionships .  
In t h e  l a t t e r  case, a series of menus al low the  u s e r  t o  spec i fy  t h e  
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The fau l t - type  menu p resen t s  a choice of t he  d i f f e r e n t  k inds  of f a u l t s .  Based 
on t h e  type of f a u l t  s e l e c t e d ,  t h e  f a u l t - l o c a t i o n  menu p r e s e n t s  t h e  choice of 
l o c a t i o n s  f o r  t he  f a u l t .  A t  t he  end of a t r i a l ,  t he  u s e r  w i l l  be given a menu 
wi th  t h r e e  options,  as discussed above: 
a )  t o  end the  demonstration sequence, 
b) t o  begin a f r e s h  wi th  an HPS (of  whatever conf igu ra t ion )  i n  normal 
operat ion and a new f a u l t ,  o r  
c) t o  continue wi th  t h e  same conf igu ra t ion  i n  i t s  degraded ( f a u l t e d )  
s t a t e ,  with workaround i n  p lace ,  and t o  select a second f a u l t .  
Elementary graphics using the  V T l O O  t e rmina l ' s  "graphics  cha rac t e r s "  are used 
t o  d i sp l ay  the  HPS conf igu ra t ions  of ISEE and IUE. 
representa t ion  conveys a l l  e s s e n t i a l  a t t r i b u t e s  of these  conf igu ra t ions ,  
inc luding  temperatures,  p ressures ,  and t h e  open/close s t a t e  of valves .  
Numerical telemetry values f o r  components are displayed by the  component 
l o c a t i o n  on the screen.  It w a s  decided not t o  use a high f u n c t i o n a l i t y  
graphics  package due t o  p o t e n t i a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  coord ina t ing  i t s  use on the  
demonstration computer. Graphics r ep resen ta t ions  f o r  t h e  HPS of ISEE and IUE 
are s to red  i n  d i sk  f i l e s .  I n  t h e  event  t h a t  t h e  u s e r  e l e c t s  t o  cons t ruc t  a 
new conf igura t ion ,  a graphic  r ep resen ta t ion  i s  not  cons t ruc ted .  I n  t h i s  
event ,  telemetry w i l l  be displayed i n  t a b u l a r  form. 
The p i c t o r i a l  
When ISEE o r  IUE conf igu ra t ions  are used, t e x t u a l  d e s c r i p t i o n s  and 
explana t ions  of system a c t i v i t y  w i l l  be presented a t  the  bottom of t he  sc reen  
i n  a four- l ine s c r o l l  region.  Most menus w i l l  be displayed i n  t h i s  reg ion  
a l s o .  For user-created conf igu ra t ions ,  te lemetry w i l l  be presented i n  one 
ha l f  of t h e  screen wi th  menus and t e x t  i n  the  o the r .  This permits  t h e  
te lemetry and/or g raph ic s  t o  remain unperturbed i n  the  upper region of t h e  
same terminal screen  as the  text.  The a l t e r n a t i v e  of using mul t ip l e  sc reens ,  
i .e.,  one f o r  graphics  and another  f o r  menus and t e x t ,  was deemed too  
unwieldly. 
The Exposure Module 
I n  a c t u a l  operat ion of a propuls ion system, i t  may be some t i m e  before  a 
f a i l e d  component i s  used and hence, before  the  ex i s t ence  of a f a u l t  i s  
r ea l i zed  by the group support  personnel.  For the  purpose of t h i s  
demonstration, w e  have chose t o  expose the  f a u l t  qu ick ly ,  gene ra t ing  
symptomatic evidence which t h e  f a u l t  handling component can use f o r  l oca t ing  
the  f a i l u r e .  
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The exposure module rece ives  from the execut ive  a d e s c r i p t i o n  of t he  
user-specif ied f a u l t .  From t h e  t y p e  of f a u l t  t h a t  i s  chosen ( l e a k ,  s tuck  
valve,  etc.) ,  t he  exposure module determines what s ta te  the  spacec ra f t  must be 
i n  t o  cause symptoms t o  appea r  i n  the te lemetry.  It might be necessary,  f o r  
example, t o  open a p a r t i c u l a r  l a t c h  valve t o  expose a f u e l  l i n e  l e a k  o r  t o  
a t tempt  t o  f i r e  through a p a r t i c u l a r  t h r u s t e r  when i t s  c a t a l y s t  bed i s  
broken. Knowing t h e  cu r ren t  s t a t e  of the  spacec ra f t ,  i t  can then e s t a b l i s h  
what a c t i o n  or series of a c t i o n s  w i l l  put t h e  spacec ra f t  i n  t he  des i r ed  
state.  These can inc lude  opening o r  c los ing  valves ,  f i r i n g  a t h r u s t e r ,  o r  i n  
c e r t a i n  cases ,  doing nothing a t  a l l  ( t h e  f a u l t  could be not iced while t h e  
system i s  "at rest"). The loca t ion  of t h e  f a u l t  may be checked t o  determine 
e x a c t l y  where t h e  a c t i o n  should be performed, but i n  some cases, the  s i t e  of 
t he  exposure a c t i o n  o r  a c t i o n s  i s  independent of t he  f a u l t  l oca t ion .  
There are ins tances  when a f a u l t  can be exposed under more than one set  of 
condi t ions ,  and the  symptoms displayed by exposing t h e  f a u l t  w i l l  be d i f f e r e n t  
f o r  each ins tance .  I n  these  cases ,  t h e  exposure module randomly chooses which 
of t he  poss ib l e  sets of exposure ac t ions  t o  execute.  The l i s t  of a c t i o n s  t o  
be performed i s  then passed back t o  t h e  execut ive.  ,The execut ive  "performs" 
these  a c t i o n s  by making appropr ia te  modi f ica t ions  t o  the  i n t e r n a l  model. 
' 
I n t e r n a l  Model of t h e  HPS 
The system's i n t e r n a l  model of the  propuls ion system i s  couched i n  a semantic 
network. Major components--valves, t anks ,  etc.--are conceptual nodes. The i r  
s t r u c t u r a l  re la&onship i s  indicated by connec t iv i ty  l i n k s  between the  nodes. 
I n  add i t ion ,  each component node has a series of o t h e r  l i n k s  i n d i c a t i n g  
a t t r i b u t e s  such as i t s  te lemetry value(s)  and whether t h e  use r  has  s p e c i f i e d  a 
f a u l t  f o r  t he  component. Conceptually, t h i s  i s  a l s o  a frame s t r u c t u r e  where 
each major component is  represented as a frame wi th  var ious a t t r i bu te -va lue  
p a i r s .  
For ISEE and IUE conf igura t ions ,  t h i s  model i s  i n i t i a l i z e d  from d i s k  f i l e s  t o  
a f a u l t - f r e e  opera t ing  s t a t e .  For user-configurat ions,  t he  model i s  b u i l t  
incremental ly  i n  accord with t h e  use r ' s  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s .  I n  e i t h e r  case, when 
the  u s e r  s e l e c t s  a f a u l t  f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  component, t he  value of t he  
f a u l t - s t a t e  a t t r i b u t e  of the  frame (node) corresponding t o  t h a t  component i s  
changed t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  f a u l t .  
S imi l a r ly ,  commands a r e  made t o  the HPS by the  exposure module and the  f a u l t  
handler .  The commands are a c t i o n s  such as  opening and c los ing  valves  and 
f i r i n g  t h r u s t e r s .  
opera t ing-s ta te  a t t r i b u t e s  of t he  re levant  HPS components. 
These a c t i o n s  a re  e f f e c t e d  by changing the  value of t h e  
The f a u l t - s t a t e  a t t r i b u t e  along with t h e  connec t iv i ty  l i n k s  and the  
opera t ing-s ta te  a t t r i b u t e s  are used by t h e  te lemet ry  genera tor  t o  produce 
te lemet ry  appropr i a t e  t o  the  current  s ta te  of t he  HPS. 
are s to red  i n  t h e  appropr ia te  a t t r i b u t e  s l o t  i n  t he  model. 
New t e l eme t ry ,va lues  
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The only pieces  of information t h a t  go from the  model t o  the  f a u l t  handl ing 
module are the connec t iv i ty  r e l a t i o n s  a t  i n i t i a l i z a t i o n  t i m e  and la te r ,  a t  run 
t i m e ,  t he  telemetry stream from the  spacec ra f t .  The FHM has no access  t o  any 
f a u l t  s ta te  information except as r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  te lemetry values.  There 
are,  conceptual ly ,  t w o  i n t e r n a l  models--one used by the  1/0 module and 
te lemetry generator  (which must know about f a u l t  s ta tes ,  e t c . ,  t o  s imula te  
v a l i d  te lemetry)  and another  used by t h e  f a u l t  handler .  For computational 
e f f i c i e n c y ,  the two are implemented i n  a s i n g l e  model. 
Telemetry Generation 
Function. 
handling system: 
2)  i t  c r e a t e s  a q u a l i t a t i v e  d i f f e r e n c e  l ist  f o r  t h e  exposure module as 
descr ibed below. 
The te lemetry genera t ion  module se rves  two purposes i n  t h e  f a u l t  
1 )  i t  computes te lemetry values  displayed f o r  t he  use r ,  and 
There are four types  of values  represent ing  the  s t a t e  of the  hydrazine 
propuls ion system: 1) telemetry va lues ,  2)  expected va lues ,  3 )  a c t u a l  va lues ,  
and 4 )  q u a l i t a t i v e  values.  Telemetry values:  t hese  are the  values  which a r e  
normally shown t o  ground c o n t r o l  monitors.  
of the  system as reported by t h e  sensors  aboard the  spacec ra f t  (whether t hese  
sensors  are  funct ioning proper ly  o r  no t ) .  Expected values:  these  are va lues  
t h a t  would appear i n  t h e  te lemet ry  stream i f  a l l  t h e  components making up t h e  
system were funct ioning normally. Actual va lues  : t he  a c t u a l  values  represent  
t h e  t r u e  s t a t e  of the  system. The a c t u a l  va lues  are only used by t h e  
These values  represent  t he  s t a t e  
te lemet ry  generat ion module. Qua l i t a t ive  values:  these- are der ived from the  
te lemet ry  values and t h e  expected values.  I f  t h e  te lemet ry  value f o r  a 
component i s  g r e a t e r  t h a t  i t s  expected value,  then the  q u a l i t a t i v e  va lue  f o r  
t h i s  component i s  the  value +l. 
t h e  expected value f o r  a component, t he  component i s  assigned the  q u a l i t a t i v e  
value of -1. 
However, i f  t he  telemetry value i s  lower than 
Call s t ruc tu re .  
The telemetry genera t ion  module i s  passed a l ist  of commands (HPS components 
and commanded s t a t e s  f o r  t hese  components). There may be, f o r  example, a 
command t o  open l a t c h  valve th ree .  
te lemetry generat ion module t o  produce te lemet ry  r e f l e c t i n g  the  cu r ren t  s t a t e  
of t h e  HPS. 
The te lemetry genera tor  i s  c a l l e d  by t h e  execut ive  module. 
This command information al lows the  
The telemetry genera t ion  module ca l l s  the  1 /0  module which updates  the  
te lemet ry  displayed f o r  t he  use r .  
t h e  use r  r e f l e c t  changes i n  the  system a s  a ground s t a t i o n  would see them. 
Once t h e  1/0 module updates the  te lemetry va lues  on the  u s e r ' s  d i sp l ay ,  i t  
r e t u r n s  cont ro l  t o  the  te lemet ry  genera t ion  module. 
The changed telemetry values  presented t o  
The telemetry genera t ion  module r e t u r n s  a l ist  of q u a l i t a t i v e  d i f f e r e n c e s  t o  
t h e  execut ive module. This  l ist  of q u a l i t a t i v e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i s  not t h e  
complete l i s t  f o r  t he  system, but  rather t h e  list of telemetry va lues  w h i c h  
d i f f e r  from t h e i r  expected values.  
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General a lgori thm. The high-level a lgor i thm f o r  the  te lemet ry  gene ra t ion  
system is  given below: 
1 )  Change t h e  s ta te  of t h e  components as commanded by the  execut ive  
2)  Compute the  te lemetry values. 
3) Compute the  expected values. 
4) Compute t h e  a c t u a l  values. 
5 )  Construct t he  q u a l i t a t i v e  d i f f e r e n c e  l i s t .  
6 )  
7) Return c o n t r o l  t o  the  execut ive module. 
module. 
Call  t he  d i sp lay  rou t ine  to  update t h e  displayed te lemet ry  values.  
Generating telemetry.  Given a s i m p l e  hydrazine propuls ion system ( s e e  f i g u r e  
below), t he  te lemetry genera t ion  module computes te lemet ry  by 1 )  computing t h e  
te lemet ry  values f o r  t h e  c u r r e n t  component, 2) c a l l i n g  rou t ines  t o  compute t h e  
te lemet ry  f o r  lower connected components, and 3) as c o n t r o l  r e t u r n s  t o  t h e  
h igher  component, propagating the  lowest f u e l  pressure  value up t h e  system. 
The te lemetry values are generated by going dep th - f i r s t  through the  h i e ra rchy  
of connected components. 
TANK 
LV 2 LV1 ( l a t c h  valves)  
EV1 EV2 EV3 EV4 (engine va lves)  
C B 1  CB 2 CB 3 CB4 (ca ta lys t -beds)  
TH1 TH2 TH3 TH4 ( t h r u s t e r s )  
For example, t he  c a l l  s t r u c t u r e  fo r  t he  components i n  t h e  above system would 
be updated t o  the  values  f o r :  1) TANK, 2 )  LV1, 3 )  EV1, 4) CB1, 5)  TH1, 6 )  EV2, 
7)  CB2, 8) TH2, 9)  LV2, 10) EV3, 11) CB3, 1 2 )  TH3, 13) EV4, 14) CB4,  15) TH4. 
Assbmptions. 
hydrazine propuls ion system. These re la te  t o  1) the  conf igu ra t ion  of  t he  
s p a c e c r a f t ,  2)  the  environment outs ide t h e  spacec ra f t ,  3) t he  phys ica l  
a t t r i b u t e s  of the  f a u l t s .  
A number of assumptions were made i n  o rde r  t o  model a genera l  
The conf igura t ion  of t h e  spacecraf t  is an i s s u e  which, f o r  t h e  purposes of 
g e n e r a l i t y ,  w e  have b a s i c a l l y  l e f t  out of t he  model. There are a number of 
ways i n  which the  a r c h i t e c t u r e  of a spacec ra f t  could inf luence  the  behavior of 
t he  hydrazine propuls ion system. As a n  example, the  d i s t ance  of t he  f u e l  
l i n e s  from t h e  ou t s ide  of t h e  spacecraf t  and the  material on t h e  ou t s ide  of of 
t h e  spacec ra f t  (whether i t  i s  r e f l e c t i v e  o r  absorbent  t o  l i g h t )  w i l l  i n f luence  
how hea t  d i s s i p a t e s  from t h e  f u e l  l i nes .  
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The environment i s  a l s o  s impl i f i ed  i n  t h e  te lemet ry  gene ra t ion  module. 
o u t s i d e  environment i s  assumed t o  be 20°F. 
gene ra t ion  module from having t o  know which p a r t s  of t h e  spacec ra f t  are in. t h e  
sun and which p a r t s  are i n  t h e  shade. This  means t h a t  t h e  telemetry 
gene ra t ion  module does not  have t o  vary i t s  model of hea t  d i s s i p a t i o n  from the  
f u e l  l i n e s .  
The 
Th i s  prevents  t h e  te lemet ry  
Cer t a in  physical  a t t r i b u t e s  of f a u l t s  have been s impl i f i ed .  The s i z e  of a 
l e a k  i s  considered uniform f o r  a l l  leaks .  The d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  f a u l t  i s o l a t i o n  
f o r  small and l a r g e  l e a k s  are only i n  t h e  t i m e  i t  t akes  f o r  t h e  f a u l t  t o  
become not iceable  ( u n l e s s  t h e  l eak  w a s  so small as t o  be undetec tab le) .  
Another assumption i s  how t h e  f u e l  l i n e s  and c a t a l y s t  beds g a i n  and l o s e  
hea t .  The bas ic  model used f o r  both t h e  f u e l  l i n e s  and c a t a l y s t  beds i s  a 
l i n e a r  model of hea t  l o s s  where t h e  rate of change i n  temperature  i s  a f f e c t e d  
by: 1 )  whether t h e  temperature  has reached one of t h e  extremes i n  i t s  range, 
and 2)  whether t h e  h e a t e r  f o r  t h e  component i s  on. In t h e  case of t h e  f u e l  
l i n e s ,  t h e  temperature can vary from 20°F t o  80" F ( t h e  maximum hea t  t h e  
h e a t e r s  can maintain) .  
Other q u a n t i t i e s  are der ived  from t h e  phys ics  of t h e  system. For example, t h e  
volume of escaping f u e l  and t s  e f f e c t  on t h e  p re s su re  can  be computed from a 
form of B e r n o l l i ' s  equat ion.  
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APPENDIX G 
Knowledge Base Documentation 
KNOWLEDGE BASE DOCUblENTATION 
Introduction 
The fault handler module (FHM) is the part of the expert system 
It which makes the most use of artificial intelligence techniques. 
interacts with the knowledge representation used by other parts of the 
system, reasons about the data it is given, requests that certain 
actions be performed when it requires additional data, and searches 
through pathways in the hydrazine propulsion system (HPS) to isolate 
the fault. 
the effects of various faults and the structure of the HPS to determine 
a "workaround", which is a series of actions designed to minimize o r  
eliminate any decrease in performance of the HPS. The FHM implemented 
in this expert system cons'ists of a knowledge base (sometimes referred 
to as a rule base) with various procedures which are used by the 
knowledge base. 
Once that fault is found, the FHM uses its knowledge about 
A knowledge base makes use of several types of knowledge. Some 
knowledge is static, such as physical laws or structural relationships. 
Other knowledge may be dynamic, such as a temperature, a resource quan- 
tity, and other values which fluctuate with time. The knowledge can be 
explicitly stored as a table or list of data, or it can be implicitly 
stored in the structure of rules and procedures. 
this FHM utilizes three areas of knowledge: 
The knowledge base of 
o Knowledge of the structure of the HPS. 
o 
o 
Knowledge of what spptoms may be produced by a fault. 
Knowledge of how an action should affect the values from a sensor. 
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Knowledge of the structure of the HPS 
~~ 
This area of knowledge includes information about the number of 
each type of component and how the components are connected (i.e., 
which components are directly above and directly below a given compo- 
nent). Some basic assumptions are made about the possible configura- 
tions for an HPS, based on the structure of ISEE-111, IUE and other 
typical systems. These dictate what types of components may be above 
and below a specific type of component, and the presence of redundancy 
in the system. 
The configuration is constrained by the following requirements : 
Component type: Component above: Component below: 
Tank None LV(S) 
Latch valve (LV) Tank(s) o r  LV(s) LV(S) or EV(s) 
Engine valve (EV) LV( SI CB * 
Catalyst bed (CB) EV * Thruster * 
Thruster , CB * None 
( 8 )  - One or more * - Exactly one 
(Configuration Constraint Table) 
Tanks, latch valves and engine valves are connected by sections of 
fuel line. These fuel lines contain line heaters, and have several 
possibilities for containing failures : 
o Failure of the line heater to turn on, causing the line to freeze 
o Failure of the line heater to shut off, causing the line to overheat 
o A leak in the line, causing loss of fuel and pressure. 
6- 2 
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A f u e l  l i n e  i s  s p e c i f i e d  by t h e  components a t  e i t h e r  end of i t .  
is poss ib l e  f o r  a s e c t i o n  of l i n e  t o  h a v e , s e v e r a l  components a t  e i t h e r  
end, as shown below: 
It 
( P a r t  of t h e  IUE hydrazine propuls ion system) 
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The l ine between these  upper and lower l a t c h  va lves  i s  func t iona l ly  
only one s e c t i o n  o f  l i n e ,  wi th  t h e  temperature and pressure  cons tan t  
throughout i ts  length.  Any f a u l t  wi th in  t h i s  l i n e  w i l l  a f fect  a l l  
these  l a t c h  valves .  Each upper l a t c h  va lve  (ULV) has below i t  the  
components ( L L V ~ ,  L L V 2 ,  U V 3 ,  U V 4 ) .  Each lower l a t c h  valve (LLV)  has  
above it  t h e  components (ULV1,  ULV2,  ULV3) .  
f i e d  as the  s e c t i o n  of l i n e  between (ULV1,  ULV2,  ULV3)  and (LLV1,  LLV2, 
The l i n e  would be speci-  
LLVS,  LLv4). 
There are a l s o  s h o r t  s e c t i o n s  of f u e l  l i n e  between a n  engine va lve  
and i t s  c a t a l y s t  bed, and between t h e  c a t a l y s t  bed and i ts  t h r u s t e r .  
The combination of t hese  t h r e e  components w i l l  be r e f e r r e d  t o  as a 
th rus t e r  set. Each t h r u s t e r  set c o n s i s t s  of exac t ly  one engine va lve ,  
one c a t a l y s t  bed and one t h r u s t e r .  
5 J E R 3  
* Thruster Set  #f Thructer Thruster $e+ ' 3  
( P a r t  of I U E  hydrazine propuls ion system) 
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c 
The expert system does not consider faults for these sections of lines 
for two reasons: 
o 
o 
The fuel line below an engine valve does not require a heater. 
It is impossible to differentiate leaks below an engine valve from 
other possible faults (such as a catalyst bed failure). 
When considering redundancy, the notion of a tank group is 
important. An example of tank groups is shown below: 
(Part of ISEE hydrazine propulsion system) 
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Even though there are eight separate tanks, there are only two 
functional tank groups. Each group has four tanks which are connected 
via the same fuel line, and have the same group of components directly 
below them. These are (LV1, LV2) for Tank Group #1 and (LV3, LV4) for 
Tank Group b2. 
A minimum amount of redundancy with regard to tank groups, latch 
valves and thrusters sets is required for workaround purposes. 
must be at least two each of tank groups, latch valves, and thruster 
sets for a user-configured HPS. 
dancy which allows a chance of successful workaround after the fault 
has been isolated. 
There 
This is the minimum amount of redun- 
The knowledge dealing with the structure of the €IPS as described 
above is maintained explicitly in the internal model of the HPS (see 
"Software Design Documentation", October, 1984 for a description of the 
internal model). 
tion and workaround stages of the fault handling process. 
isolation process, the fault handler needs to know the structure of 
fuel lines and valves not only to be able to reason about the initial 
information it receives when the fault is exposed, but also to be able 
This knowledge is used by the FHM in bot4 the isola- 
During the 
to "command" specific valves and thrusters when it needs more informa- 
tion. Once the fault has been isolated, the workaround procedures use 
the structural information to close off parts of the system. 
necessary to prevent, or at least minimize, any effects from the fault 
in future operation of the system. 
leaking, all valves directly above and below that section of line would 
be closed and considered unusable. T h i s  may 
This is 
For example, if a fuel line were 
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cause t h e  loss of a set of tanks, a set  of t h r u s t e r s ,  o r  a s e c t i o n  of 
f u e l  l i n e ,  which i s  why redundancy i s  e s s e n t i a l  in t h e  conf igu ra t ion  of 
an H P S .  
Knowledge of t h e  symptoms produced by a f a u l t  
This  is  intended t o  represent  t h e  experience which would be accumu- 
lated by a human expe r t  i n  i s o l a t i n g  f a u l t s .  
p re s su re  reading,  f o r  example, would usua l ly  suggest e i t h e r  a f u e l  l e a k  
An abnormally low 
o r  a f a u l t y  p re s su re  sensor.  
considerably.  
however, could be caused by many things.  
would no t  be a b l e  t o  deduce much about t h e  f a u l t .  
is arranged so t h a t  t h e  FHM is a b l e  t o  "deduce" t h e  same t h i n g s  as a 
This  narrows t h e  l ist  of p o s s i b l e  f a u l t s  
A change i n  a t t i t u d e  which w a s  d i f f e r e n t  t han  expected, 
I n  t h i s  case, a human e x p e r t  
The knowledge base 
human, given t h e  same information. 
When t h e  FHM is first cal led,  t h e  symptoms which r e s u l t e d  from 
exposing t h e  f a u l t  are made a v a i l a b l e  t o  i t  by being put i n t o  what is 
c a l l e d  working memory. After t h e  d a t a  r ep resen t ing  t h e  symptoms are 
put  i n t o  working memory, they w i l l  cause one o r  more r u l e s  t o  " f i r e " .  
A r u l e  f i r e s  when i ts  l e f t  hand s i d e  (LHS) has been s a t i s f i e d ,  which 
could be thought of as causing t h e  I F  p a r t  of an  IF-THEN c l a u s e  t o  
become t r u e .  When t h e  rule f i r e s ,  i ts r i g h t  hand s i d e  (RHS), o r  the  
THEN part of an IF-THEN clause,  is  executed. 
The RHS may cal l  procedures which "send" commands t o  t h e  space- 
craft, causing i t  t o  change its state and r e s u l t i n g  i n  new d a t a  being 
put i n t o  working memory. 
working memory. I n  e i t h e r  case, t h e  new d a t a  may then s a t i s f y  t h e  LHS 
of o the r  rules, which w i l l  cause them t o  f ire.  
Also, t h e  RHS may i n s e r t  d a t a  d i r e c t l y  i n t o  
Th i s  cyc le  w i l l  
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continue until sone goal has been achieved, such as isolating a fault. 
One possibility for rules would be: 
Rule #1 
IF: 
THEN: Assert catalyst-bed-heater-or-sensor-fault AND 
A catalyst bed sensor reports an abnormal temperature 
Fire the thruster below that catalyst bed 
Rule #2 
IF: There is catalyst-bed-heater-or-sensor-fault AND 
There is unexpected attitude adjustment 
THEN: Assert catalyst-bed-heater-fault 
If this were part of an expert system, something might be placed 
in working memory saying there was a symptom of an abnormal temperature 
reading from a catalyst bed sensor. 
in working memory an assertion that there was a catalyst bed heater or 
' Rule #l would then fire and place 
sensor fault, and request that the thruster below the catalyst bed be 
fired. If the fault was with the catalyst bed heater as opposed to the 
temperature sensor, then the attitude adjustment which resulted from 
firing the thruster would be different than expected. Rule #2 would 
then fire and assert that there was a catalyst bed heater fault. 
The rules in the FHM are written and ordered such that at least 
one rule will fire as soon as there are any symptoms, and any rule that 
initially fires will cause a significant reduction in the number of 
possible faults under consideration. This is possible because each 
"class" of faults (such as a fuel leak, stuck valve, broken heater, 
etc.) has a symptom or small combination of symptoms that are unique to 
that class. By writing rules which look for exactly those symptoms, 
initially reducing the fault possibilities becomes straightforward. 
c 
Consider t h e  symptom of an abnormally low p res su re  reading ,  f o r  
There are s e v e r a l  f a u l t s  which could cause t h i s  synptom. example. 
could be a f a u l t y  p re s su re  sensor ,  a f u e l  l i n e  l e a k ,  o r  an  engine va lve  
s tuck  open. However, i n  add i t ion  t o  t h e  rule which checks f o r  abnormal 
pressure ,  t h e r e  is a r u l e  which checks f o r  an engine va lve  being 
s tuck.  If  t h a t  rule hasn't f i r e d  when t h e  abnormal p re s su re  r u l e  
f i r e s ,  w e  know t h a t  t h e  f a u l t  is no t  an engine va lve  s tuck  open, there-  
f o r e  it must be a f a u l t y  sensor o r  l i n e  leak .  
It 
Precise l o c a t i o n  of the f a u l t  i s  not  as simple as t h e  i n i t i a l  
reduct ion  of p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  
f a i r l y  w e l l  by reasoning w i t h  t h e  i n i t i a l  symptoms, bu t  o t h e r  cases may 
r e q u i r e  va r ious  a c t i o n s  t o  be performed t o  obta ined  a d d i t i o n a l  da t a .  
U s e  of t hese  a c t i o n s  i s  discussed i n  t h e  next  s e c t i o n .  
The f a u l t  can sometimes be pinpointed 
Knowledge about w h a t  symptoms may be produced by a f a u l t  is  
i m p l i c i t l y  s t o r e d ,  as opp.osed t o  t h e  explicit s t o r i n g  of t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  
knowledge. 
t h e  f i r i n g  sequence of t h e  rules. 
is  used i n  wr i t i ng  t h e  set  of symptoms and o t h e r  d a t a  necessary  f o r  t he  
r u l e  t o  f i r e .  It is a l s o  used i n  deciding w h a t  a c t i o n s  t h e  r u l e  should 
reques t ,  s i n c e  a c t i o n s  are geared t o  uncovering s p e c i f i c  symptoms. I n  
t h e  f i r i n g  sequence of  t h e  ru l e s ,  knowledge about t h e  symptoms of a 
f a u l t  is u s e f u l  when determining which rule t o  f i r e  when t h e  same set  
of symptoms could cause two o r  more r u l e s  t o  f i r e .  I f  a system chose 
randomly between two r u l e s  which could f ire,  i t  might choose one t h a t  
w a s  only u s e f u l  when i s o l a t i n g  a f a u l t  which i n  this case had been 
ru l ed  out.  
changes what d a t a  is i n  working memory. 
This  knowledge is imbedded i n  both t h e  actual r u l e s  and i n  
I n  t h e  a c t u a l  r u l e s ,  t h e  knowledge 
This  is important t o  cons ider ,  s i n c e  f i r i n g  a r u l e  u s u a l l y  
Properly us ing  knowledge about 
the symptoms of a fault will cause certain rules to fire in a particu- 
lar order, analogous to the way in which experts would try out their 
hypotheses. 
Knowledge of how an action should affect the readings from a sensor 
Knowing the effect an action should have on sensor readings under 
both normal and faulty operating conditions corresponds to another type 
of knowledge acquired by a human expert. 
fault, various actions can be performed to provide additional informa- 
tion. The resulting information would be useless 'unless the expert 
knew what the results of each action should be if all affected compo- 
nents were functioning properly, and had some idea of what the readings 
might be if a suspected component were indeed malfunctioning. This 
knowledge in the F H M  enables the choosing of an action which will 
generate the most useful data for the isolation process. 
When trying to isolate a 
When designing a rule base, points will be found in a rule 
sequence where additional data is necessary for the system to proceed. 
At those points, the RHS of a rule will request an action to be per- 
formed. Performing the action may cause other symptoms, which would 
then fire other rules. The action chosen will be the one nost likely 
to yield the data needed to proceed in the fault isolation process. 
Examples of actions which could be requested by the FHM are the 
A latch valve closing of a latch valve or the firing of a thruster. 
might be closed to check a section of fuel line. 
after closing the valve, then the fault which is causing that symptom 
lies somewhere between the closed valve and the sensor. 
does not persist after closing the valve, the fault lies on the other 
side of the valve from the sensor. 
If a symptom persists 
If the symptom 
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Firing a thruster is used mainly to determine whether or not the 
Nearly fault is affecting the attitude adjustment of the spacecraft. 
all component failures will affect the attitude adjustment in some 
manner, while a faulty sensor will have no effect. 
thruster is used in nearly every rule sequence to discriminate between 
component and sensor failures. 
Therefore, firing a 
Knowledge about the effect of an action on the readings from a 
sensor is, like the knowledge about fault symptoms, implicitly stored. 
This knowledge is embedded mainly in the rules. As mentioned above, 
knowledge about the effects of actions is useful when determining which 
action should be performed. Also, knowing what symptoms an action may 
uncover is useful when determining what symptoms are required for the 
next rule in a sequence. 
None of these types of knowledge are totally distinct from each 
Structural knowledge is used in determining how actions will other. 
affect a sensor reading, and also in determining the symptoms of a 
fault. Also, the purpose of understanding the effects of an action is 
to interpret the symptoms resulting from an action, so both this knowl- 
edge and the knowledge about the symptoms of a particular fault are 
taken into account in writing the rules of a system. 
ExamDle of FHM isolating fault 
Fault: fuel line leak below latch valve dl (in the ISEE 
configuration) 
Symptoms: Pressure sensors indicate abnormally low pressure 
Rule sequence: 
#I PRESSURE-ABNORMAL rule fires 
(Deduction: Fault is fuel leak o r  faulty pressure sensor) 
ACTION: Fire-random-thruster 
(Reason: Get more data, causing more rules to fire) 
#2 ATTITUDE-ABNORMAL rule fires 
(Deduction: Fault affects the attitude adjustment when a 
thruster is fired) 
113 FUEL-LEAK rule fires 
(Deduction: There is a fuel leak in either a tank or fuel 
line) 
ACTION: Close-all-valves 
(Reason: Help isolate tank or line section containing leak) 
ACTION: Open-leftmost-topmost-latch-valve 
(Reason: Check section of line immediately below that latch 
valve) 
#4 PRESSURE-ABNORMAL rule fires 
(Deduction: Fault has been found. There is a leak in the 
fuel line between the latch valve which was 
just opened and the component or components 
directly below it) 
ACTION: Workaround-line-leak-fault 
(Reason: Will close off that section of line, system will 
work as normal with redundant line and thrusters 
used) 
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#5 SYSTEM-WORI(AROUND-DONE rule fires 
(Deduction: The FHM is finished with isolation and 
workaround of fault. 
should now be functional, relying on redundant 
componentry and pathways) 
The hydrazine systeru 
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